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Research Proposal  
 
What impact does the teaching of History have on young people’s understanding 
of national identity?  
 
Edward Hynes 
 
Abstract 
 
This research paper examines the relationship between history teaching, citizenship 
education and the effect these subjects may have on a student’s notion of national 
identity, in particular how history education helps shape their perceptions of a British 
identity. History and citizenship education are both utilised as conduits to increase a 
sense of a national identity and civic engagement, nation building is strongly affiliated 
with national history but does history teaching have an impact on students’ perceptions 
of national identity? And is citizenship education working in producing young persons’ 
who view themselves as citizens of the United Kingdom? (UK). Additionally given the 
level of political interference in history teaching, citizenship education and national 
identities do students’ subscribe to political articulations of what Britishness is?  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Within the past decade ‘the form and purpose of history’ (Grever et al, 2008) has been 
the subject of a high profile political debate which can be seen as a direct consequence 
of the re-emergence of the contestation of the ‘politics of Britishness.’ (Andrews et al, 
2009) The recent political discourse has focused on promoting the need for a British 
national identity to help unite British citizens through shared values and a common 
understanding of what Britishness is. This is in direct response to a growing feeling that 
a multi-national UK has lost its national identity. It seems the classroom has become the 
battleground on which competing groups dispute how and what history is taught which 
transcends into a struggle for culture, for identity and for hegemony.’ (Phillips, 1998: 42)  
 
A central theme underlying the assertions that Britain is suffering an ‘identity crisis’ is 
that a post imperial Britain has since 1945 changed quite dramatically. This is both in 
terms of its demographic of citizens and its place in terms of international relations. The 
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processes and outcomes of both devolution and mass immigration have become distinct 
factors for this change. Furthermore a Britain coming to terms with the loss of an Empire 
and more recently the erosion of sovereignty to the European Union (EU) has resulted in 
a scramble to articulate a coherent idea of national identity. No more profoundly has this 
been felt than in the history classroom.  
 
The main questions that this paper highlights are; firstly. Does history teaching succeed 
in increasing a sense of national identity for its students? Given the level of political 
interference and the importance attached to history teaching regarding Britishness and 
identity, it is of great importance to actually assess what if any impact history teaching 
actually has upon students of this discipline.  
 
Secondly, are the students willing to subscribe to a version of Britishness and British 
history promoted by the state? Again there has been frequent political interference in 
both history teaching and in politicians articulating their respective versions, thus there is 
a need to assess this rhetoric against the notions of history students to see whether 
politicians’ renderings of Britishness reflect that of young students. This is especially the 
case as the students participating in this study will doubtless possess their own ideas 
regarding identity and what a national identity should perhaps be composed of. Young 
people are exposed to other external influences, ie from their own families and 
communities. These outside have a strong possibility of affecting their respective ideas 
and attitudes in relation to a national identity, possibly to a much greater extent than 
history or citizenship education. Therefore expecting them to willingly accept a notion of 
Britishness developed by politicians may be misguided.  
 
Thirdly, we will assess to what extent students affiliate themselves as citizens of The 
United Kingdom (UK). Just has history teaching has been used as method for 
transmitting a sense of national identity, citizenship education has aimed to increase a 
sense of civic participation and political engagement. Therefore we will be highlighting 
what impact citizenship education has had on making students’ view themselves as 
citizens and their awareness of their rights and roles within a political community.  
 
There has also been much debate surrounding the suitability of history teaching as a 
vehicle for which national identity should be promoted through. Berger and Lorenz 
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(2008) amongst others suppose that national history teaching is imperative for 
successful nation building. Nonetheless Britain’s distinctive status as a multi-national 
state means that finding a common British identity that all can relate to is problematic, 
there are four nations existing under the banner of the UK which means four differing 
historiographies of British history. Furthermore the UK is multi cultural and multi ethnic 
thus forging an inclusive sense of civic Britishness is difficult due to the diverse nature of 
such a plural society. This problem is further complicated when politicians on both sides 
scramble to appropriate the past in order to construct a history curriculum that they 
believe will build a greater sense of British identity. This is an important area to asses as 
policy makers and politicians today, and over the decades have attached a great degree 
of importance to history teaching which has become central to numerous policies 
especially in relation to citizenship and identity politics.  
 
Despite the broad consensus that history teaching has a prescriptive part to play in 
galvanizing national identity, there is to date little comprehensive evidence that history 
teaching is indeed a suitable vehicle for policy makers to press the identity issue through 
with. Additionally there is no conclusive evidence that history teaching has any 
significant effect on students’ notions of national identity. Therefore to assess the impact 
that history has on young on students’ perceptions of a British identity is potentially a 
very important one. The study will also assess what aspects of Britishness make them 
allude to a sense of pride as politicians have recently attached great importance to one 
feeling proud of their country. 
 
Methodology  
 
This research project has required a large amount of desktop research including the 
researching of academic books and journals, Government publications including 
publications from the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), and the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES).  We have also utilised publications from 
non governmental organisations such as The Office for Standards in Education, 
Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) and the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR). Furthermore we have researched articles on this topic from British newspapers.  
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Further to the desktop research we have conducted visits to 2 schools in Kirklees to 
compile and analyse survey data from 72 history and citizenship education students. 
The research itself comprised of an anonymous questionnaire, which inculcates both 
quantitative and qualitative data sections that provide a detailed picture of the views and 
ideas of the participants regarding the topics on the survey. The selected schools that 
participated in the study represented contrasting socio economic backgrounds within the 
Kirklees area and were multi ethnic populated schools. This has provided us with data 
from students with differing social backgrounds, differing races and religions, and has in 
turn provided us with a wide demographic of students with an extensive range of views 
and opinions.  
 
I received permission from both schools (Royds Hall High School and Colne Valley 
Specialist Arts College) to undertake the survey with pupils who were studying either 
history or citizenship at GCSE level. The sample size of the participants was 72 and all 
were aged between 14 -16 years old. All participants were made aware that whilst the 
survey was anonymous it was also voluntary. Both the staff and participants at the 
school were also informed that the results of the survey would be made available to 
them once the work had been completed, submitted and returned. The field research 
itself comprised of an anonymous, mainly scaled questioned survey, which was 
designed initially by Dr. Andrew Mycock and Dr. Catherine Mcglynn and adapted by 
myself for the purpose of this work. The participants completed the survey online and 
were supervised by myself and Dr. Mycock should problems arise with the mechanics of 
the survey or confusion surrounding any terminology used in the questionnaire, at no 
time during the completion of the survey were the participants advised on how they 
should answer any questions. The data was then analysed by myself and the findings 
presented in this work.  
 
The methodology of using a mainly quantitative anonymous questionnaire meant that 
the participants’ responses to what is a complex issue could be analysed, measured and 
captured coherently. However the survey also included qualitative sections that asked 
the participants’ to provide examples of their own, these responses were collated by 
myself and grouped into wider categorisations that inculcated their specific responses. 
The only ethical concern has been my visits to the aforementioned schools, for this I 
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completed a Criminal record Bureau search (CRB) search and was accompanied on 
both visits to the schools by my main supervisor.  
 
As this research paper is based in one local authority it is therefore comprised of a 
relatively small sample. Nonetheless the results from this study can be used alongside 
or against similar work in this area (Fenton, 2007, Grever et al, 2008, Clark 2009) for 
granting further understanding into why young people feel the way they do. The data 
collected from 72 students will offer an insight as to how young people perceive 
Britishness, how they relate to a national identity and what factors they feel are important 
in constructing and articulating a British identity.   
 
Whilst this study is concerned with both history teaching and its relationship with national 
identity, there are a few limitations and aspects of both fields that we are not looking 
explore. Firstly the study will not be looking to assess which type of history teaching is 
best suited to providing a national narrative that appeals to the most students, whilst we 
will be highlighting the debate that exists between ‘new’ and ‘traditional’ forms of history 
teaching we will not be looking to favour one over the other. Secondly although a 
sizeable portion of the study is dedicated to analysing participant’s responses on 
national identity and also highlighting the conflation between citizenship and nationality. 
We will not be assessing which identity the participants hold particular salience for and 
have omitted a question asking the respondents to provide their ‘nationality’. 
 
 
Structure of Thesis 
 
The initial focus of Chapter 1 is to identify the key theories surrounding nationalism and 
its complex connection with the state and citizenship. I will illustrate that nationalism and 
citizenship provoke competition from each other in regards to national and state 
identities, and the two concepts are often intertwined and confused. The first chapter will 
also address the complexities of a multi-nation state such as the UK and its relationship 
with nationalism and citizenship which is further complicated by the processes of 
immigration and devolution.  An overview of the concept of Britishness is critically 
discussed in this first chapter which provides a conceptual overview which is then tied to 
some consideration of its empirical application in the case of the UK. Whilst assessing 
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the political discourse surrounding Britishness in order to relate this to the participants 
own notions of a British identity in further chapters.  
 
In chapter 2 I will focus on history teaching and citizenship education, considering the 
complexities surrounding national history teaching. Whilst it is important to look at the 
context of the history debate, it is equally important to link some of the theories around 
nationalism and citizenship and their relationship with history teaching, and discuss 
some of the key theories surrounding the purpose of national history teaching. 
Illustrating that the amalgamation and confusion of nationality and citizenship highlighted 
in the last chapter is mirrored in the history classroom.  I will also address the political 
interference that history teaching has been subject to and highlight the debate 
surrounding the differing methods of history teaching. The role of Citizenship education 
is analysed in this chapter, which focuses on the reason for its introduction, the problems 
it has encountered and its relationship with history teaching.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 will both comprise of the results from the field research. The 
questionnaire was entitled ‘What does it mean to be British?’ and comprises of 6 
sections therefore the analysis of the survey will be also sectioned into 6 sub headings 
denoting the sections in the survey. The study contains both qualitative and quantitative 
data as questions included a multiple choice rating system but also direct qualitative 
questions asking the participants to describe in their own words their feelings on what 
Britishness was, what values it consisted of, and figures that made them feel proud/not 
proud to be British. In this section we will be analysing the data and assessing the 
findings by linking the findings to the theoretical and empirical work done in the previous 
chapters. Chapter 3 will explore findings that relate to the work outlined in chapter 1 and 
chapter 4 will address data that relates to the theoretical and empirical debates 
highlighted in chapter 2. The last section will be the Conclusion, where I will highlight the 
main themes and findings from the field research data, applying our findings to answer 
the original research questions that this study has posed.  
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Chapter 1 
  
In this chapter the focus will be on nationalism and citizenship and how these complex 
factors behave in a modern multi-nation state such as the United Kingdom. Firstly we will 
identify some of the key theoretical arguments surrounding nationalism and its 
complicated relationship with the state and citizenship. We will argue that as the UK 
comprises four nations within a state, nationality and citizenship are often confused but 
are in fact very different concepts.  
 
The next purpose of this chapter is to analyse Britishness, both conceptually and 
empirically. We will focus on the shifting description from early inceptions to more recent 
definitions, reflecting the changes of devolution, immigration and the decline of the 
empire in British society. This will address the application of some of the highlighted 
theoretical arguments and how they have transcended from theory to political rhetoric 
and policy discourse. We will also look at the problematic nature of creating an inclusive 
sense of Britishness as politicians struggle to agree on an articulation of what 
‘Britishness’ is. It is important to analyse their rhetoric, as this will provide a fuller picture 
on the discourse surrounding national identity. 
 
Understanding Nationalism 
 
When we discuss the role of history in promoting national values and identity we are 
looking at an area that has long remained problematic and fragmented, given that 
nationalism as a subject is such a vast concept it its not surprising that ‘authors in one 
discipline are unfamiliar with theory in another, or that there is overlap and duplication.’ 
(Alter, 1985:169) Not only is there no agreed definition due to the multi discipline nature 
of nationalism, the study of nationalism has also undoubtedly shifted over time, and as 
Smith (2008, 318) suggests there is not just a single divide between differing 
protagonists such as modernists and primordialists but a whole series of different and 
cross cutting debates in an ever expanding field. Despite the swathes of literature and 
research in this complex field (Gellner, 1983. Anderson,1982. Hobsbawm,1989. Smith, 
2003,2008. Bilig, 1990) it is possible to discern some of the key theories in this area. 
Although debates surrounding nationalism have changed over time, the ‘classic debate’ 
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between perennial or primordialist notions of nationalism and the sociological modernist 
view remains an important one.  
 
The perennial argument supposes that nations as well as nationalisms are ancient 
phenomena and did not emerge at the time of the French and American revolutions, as 
most modernist historians and social scientists claim. As Smith (2003, 25) notes neither 
nations nor nationalisms were the product of modernity. On the contrary, a sizeable 
number of European nations (and their nationalisms) can be traced back to the middle 
ages. Modernists view nationalism in an altogether different light. Viewing nations and 
nationalism as an ‘instrument of progress, they were to be seen as historically modern, 
not immemorial’ (Smith, 2008: 320) For Gellner the prerequisites and preservation of 
nationalism include universal literacy, and a society committed to economic growth 
through a commitment to social mobility. Gellner (1983) challenged amongst others the 
perennial view of nationalism. He argued that nationalism is ‘distinctive to modern 
industrial society and intimately connected to its mode of production.’ (O’Leary, 1997: 
10) Therefore neither nationalism nor nations could be antique as per societies such as 
tribal or agrarian. In the modern industrial society, by contrast, nationalism is an 
essential part of the cultural environment, ‘a high culture pervades the whole of society, 
defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity. That is the secret of nationalism.’ 
(Gellner, 1983: 18) this insight attempts to show us that ‘modern societies were 
fundamentally nationalist whether they admitted it or not’ (McCrone & Kiely, 2000, 24). 
 
In Hans Kohn’s essay ‘The idea of nationalism.’ Kohn attempted to justify the superiority 
of Western forms of nationalism (civic) over Eastern European nationalism (ethnic). 
Kohn’s dichotomy was that nationalism in the West was linked to individual liberty and 
rational cosmopolitanism whereas in the East the opposite was the case (Kohn, 1944) 
The assumption being that ‘ethnic’ nationalism is disruptive and potentially leads to 
violence and state disintegration.’ (Hansen et al, 2009: 2). The absence of civic 
institutions and a bourgeoisie promoting tolerant and inclusive attitudes in Eastern 
countries (as was found in the West) meant nationalism was more organic and reliant 
upon intellectuals to articulate a national idea through the manipulation of memories, 
symbols, myths and ethnic identities. (Kuzio, 2002: 22) 
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Despite his influence in providing a framework for understanding nationalism Kuzio 
(2002) and Kymlicka (1996, 2000) have both criticised Kohn. In particular Kuzio 
(2002:36) has argued that Western states have not always been civic but have recently 
evolved from ethnic to civic states. The division of nationalism by geographic position 
posed by Kohn presupposes the West has always been fully inclusive of social and 
ethnic groups. This overlooks the Western liberal democracies that have also engaged 
in campaigns of cultural homogenisation and in the repression of minority nationalisms. 
(Kymlicka, 2000: 186). 
  
An important theory for understanding the debate surrounding nationalism is Anderson’s 
(1989) concept that the nation is an ‘imagined political community.’ That is a nation is 
imagined because ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion’. (Anderson, 1989: 6) What is interesting about this theory 
is that it relates to a ‘imagined political community’ that is, a relationship between 
members of the community within a state and the state itself. It is exclusively a political 
relationship that highlights a civic dimension of nationalism. McCrone & Kiely, (2000: 25) 
identify the ethnic dynamic of nationalism, ‘a cultural concept which binds people on the 
basis of shared identity.’ There is broad agreement that nationalism acts as a common 
identifier that possesses both ethnic and civic dimensions in much the same way as 
Kuzio identified ethnic and civic elements in all nations. Furthermore Anderson’s 
imagined community is one that assimilates ‘imagining and creation.’ (Anderson, 1991: 
6) This creation is seen by Hobsbawm as what he termed the ‘invented tradition’ that is 
‘traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes 
invented.’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1989) 
 
For Anderson the education and expansion of the ‘reading classes’ from what was 
previously exclusively for the ruling elites was coupled with the increased use for printing 
presses. However Hobsbawm (1989) also notes the use of education for inculcating a 
common patriotism, which in effect means occupying the masses to prevent any serious 
threat or revolution to the ruling clique. This was central for accelerating nationalism, and 
the rise in literacy had ‘to be understood in its relationship to vernacular print-capitalism.’ 
(Anderson, 1991: 76)  Therefore we can see that education is viewed as an effective 
conduit for nation building. Both Anderson and Hobsbawm strongly indicate that 
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nationalism is something that is constructed through elite defined measures such as 
literacy and industry as opposed to the perennial approach of a more organic 
nationalism. This nationalism or nationhood inculcates two differing approaches as to its 
origins, emanating from these established perspectives of nationalism, whether that is 
the organic perennial approach or the more elite defined modernist view as discussed 
comes a sense of nationalism that through subtle devices reinforces nationalism on a 
daily basis. A concept of which Billig (1995) termed ‘banal nationalism.’  
 
Billig’s thesis has ‘struck a chord for many academics trying to understand the subtle 
insinuation of nationhood into daily life,’ (Hearn, 2007) it is the idea that nationalism can 
be prolonged through implicit daily flagging in citizens lives. This ‘flagging’ includes 
symbolic reinforcements such as coins, flags and street names but also the use of 
language throughout media outlets, addressing a national audience by using deictic 
language such as ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘us’ and ‘here’ to signify the presence of the nation. (Billig, 
1995) What we have discerned here is a number of the key theories surrounding the 
debate on nationalism. We have shown that as Western states are not purely comprised 
of civic nationalism the UK sits well with possessing both ethnic and civic nationalisms.  
 
The United Kingdom: Citizenship and Identity in a Multi-nation state 
 
We are primarily concerned with nationalism in relation to an individual’s identity and the 
salience that it may hold over other competing components of an identity. In the UK 
nationalism competes with citizenship as significant factors in for ones identity and whilst 
the two terms mean very different things they are often conflated to be the same.  
Citizenship is according to McCorne and Kiely (2000) a political concept deriving from 
people’s relationship to the state, and the promotion of Citizenship is often taken as 
integral to the democratic processes of the UK. However, when the state is comprised of 
four nations this relationship is complicated by sub-state national identities. The UK is 
‘unfamiliar with, or hierarchically nervous about, the very concept of citizen’ (Crick, 
2002). This notion of equal right as citizens and a political relationship with the state 
rather than the nation has particular resonance within multi-national states such as the 
UK, especially since devolution in 1997 significantly altered the constitutional settlement 
(Andrews and Mycock, 2007) It is within the context of increased devolution and 
secession to the EU that meanings of nationality and national identity are being re-
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examined and redefined. Political and constitutional developments can encourage those 
from both ethnic majority and minority communities to reflect on the meaning of 
citizenship and the degree to which they experience a sense of belonging to the nation 
and state. (Olser, 2000) 
 
Nationalism is regarded as a significant dimension of identity and as Gellner (1983) 
asserts most people see themselves, more or less as members of nations or states. This 
indicates the prominence of both cultural (nation) and political (state) identities. Certainly 
in the context of the UK both these actors hold significance over ones identity and are 
especially problematic as state identity (UK) and national identities (English, Scottish, 
Welsh, etc) have evolved in a highly implicit manner’ (McCrone & Kiely, 2000: 1) in this 
work we are looking at the concept of citizenship as a political identity but note that it has 
the potential to accommodate both (just as nationalism does) civic and cultural (ethnic) 
elements. Gellner asserted that ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent.’ These assertions are 
somewhat problematic for the UK not least as England, Wales and Scotland can all be 
described as stateless nations and the UK is a state made up of multiple nations. 
Therefore in the UK congruence between national and state identities is rarely if ever 
achieved thus citizenship and nationality are often intertwined and compete with one 
another for prominence regarding identity. Just as there is a conflation of English and 
British history in the national curriculum, this is mirrored in identity politics with many 
treating national and state identities ‘as synonyms for each other’ (McCrone & Kiely, 
2000, 19). This is further complicated as it is possible for a UK citizen residing in the UK 
to simultaneously possess dual national identities in the shape of Britishness 
(citizenship) and English, Scottish, Welsh (nationality) which can overlap and intertwine 
with one another. 
 
A Crisis of Britishness 
 
As Parekh (2000: 6) has commented every political community needs to and, as a rule, 
tends to develop a view of its own identity, of the kind of community it is and wishes to 
be, which follows on from Andersons ‘imagined political community’ theory. The problem 
for the UK is that there are differing viewpoints surrounding its identity. A number of 
commentators have argued that a shared sense of ‘Britishness’ could help a UK with 
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cultural diverse cities and neighbourhoods relate better to one another across religious 
and ethnic lines. While allegiance to the nation has declined slightly in favour to the sub 
state identities of the UK, nationality remains a significant factor of identification. This 
change in loyalties away from Britain to the constituent nations of the UK means that 
national and state identities are becoming interwoven and confused, furthermore 
politically Britishness has become increasingly important and equally problematic 
  
Muir & Wetherell (2010: 5) have illustrated that British society has moved towards a 
much greater cultural diversity, which is largely due to the processes of economic 
globalization which have resulted in sustained high levels of net immigration. This has 
helped Britain’s ethnic minority population increase from just 4 per cent in 1981 to 8 per 
cent in the 2001 census, and it is widely expected that this proportion will increase 
further by the time of the next census in 2011. The rise in migration and the resultant 
multi-cultural society that England in particular now possesses has increased and 
complicated the loss of a feeling of an English national identity.  
 
State identity in the shape of a British identity has evolved alongside the national 
identities of Scotland, England and Wales. The increase in multiculturalism within Britain 
has added to the complexity and diversity of multiple identities resulting in ethnic and 
civic identities competing with one another. However it is possible to possess multiple 
identities at any given time. Certainly one identity may have preference over another, but 
identities are interchangeable depending on the individual. Fenton (2007: 327) notes that 
in the lives of individuals nation competes with other identities. Certainly those who hold 
regional identities as important in England such as the Cornish or Londoners may do so 
alongside their national identity, instead of or interchangeably with a sense of national 
identity. McCrone (2002:307) suggests that national identity is not fixed and can change 
over space and time. Therefore national identities are not essential, given or 
unproblematic. Whilst they are certainly not unproblematic nor a given, to many a 
national identity holds a great amount of influence, but that does not mean to say 
differing identities can not have primacy with an individual at different times. This is 
simply an individual’s choice. It can be reasonable to expect for example a person to feel 
more English during a sporting event such as the World cup and perhaps more British at 
the Olympic Games and more attached to a regional identity in say supporting a county 
cricket match. 
 16
 
McCrone (2002) asserts that Englishness is something largely reserved for white 
natives, with some who view Britishness as being ‘tainted’ by multiculturalism. This 
suggests that Englishness is becoming a more instinctive identity and it would appear 
that a feeling of Englishness as opposed to Britishness is on the increase. With a few 
exceptions ‘the English appear to becoming more ‘English’ at the expense of being 
British.’ (Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007: 252) However Kenny and Lodge (2009: 225) 
suggest that whilst English nationalism may have risen slightly it has not replaced a 
sense of Britishness. Englishness has for many people added to the stock of multiple 
identities that we enjoy holding, thus a majority remain comfortable with the idea of 
holding dual loyalties to England and Britain.  
 
Various factors have helped strengthen English identity over the last decade. Gamble 
(2003: 9) ascribes the rise of sub-state nationalisms to devolution, decolonisation, 
European integration and immigration, in particular that of England’s. Thus as England’s 
political extensions have been eroded the English are being forced to rediscover 
themselves and define themselves afresh in relation to Britain and the other nations of 
Britain. The development of devolution to Scotland and Wales undertaken by the Labour 
administration in 1997 has led to the home countries (excluding Northern Ireland), 
possessing an increased sense of national identity towards their sub-state nationalities 
rather than the overarching British one. Research carried out by the Institute of Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) showed that a majority of people in Scotland felt more Scottish 
than British, similarly in Wales there has been a rise in those saying they feel more 
Welsh than British (Stone & Muir, 2007) thus arguably the process of devolution has 
weakened links to Britishness. One reason for the rise in Scottish nationalism as 
Kearney (2000: 23) argues is the dissatisfaction at British policies affecting them has 
had a profound effect on Scottish nationalism. Likewise the argument extends to the rise 
of Englishness which has in part risen due to grievances felt over inequalities of 
spending in the devolution programme and being ‘prompted to think of themselves in 
contradistinction to the dominant English.’ (Bryant, 2003: 394) However it can be 
misleading to think devolution is the sole cause of the rise of Englishness as Kenny & 
Lodge (2009: 223) claim it neglects the fragmentary complexity of contemporary 
manifestations of Englishness and wrongly identifies devolution as the sole cause of 
their emergence.  
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Nonetheless Kenny (2010) claims that an attachment to Englishness has become a 
more significant feature within the social culture of England than many of our politicians 
have realised, which can be ascribed to the increase of the ‘normalisation of 
manifestations of English symbolism and culture in everyday life.’ (Kenny & Lodge, 
2009: 225) That this symbolism is commonplace highlights an example of what Billig 
termed ‘Banal Nationalism’.  
 
We can utilise Anderson’s notion of an ‘imagined political community’ and see the glue 
holding Britain together has become much weaker due to greater challenges from 
devolution, European integration and migration. It is perhaps then not too strong to talk 
of a contemporary crisis of British identity.’ (Tilley & Heath, 2007: 663) In an attempt to 
address this perceived crisis politicians have sought to define what Britishness means in 
the twenty first century. As ‘Britishness’ is an essentially contested concept there is 
much debate as to how effective and relevant these politicians attempts have been. 
 
The shifting nature of Britishness 
 
As politicians clamour to express what Britishness is in the twenty first century it is first 
pertinent to explore its changing nature over the years. Recently the collapse of the 
British Empire, Immigration and the post war consensus has resulted in not only shifting 
notions of what Britishness is but a changing multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society that has 
resulted in changing relationships between the citizens and the state. The UK also has 
an imperial legacy which has resulted in mass immigration of people from around the 
world. To address the complexities of the UK it is important to grasp that the problematic 
nature of Britishness is not a new occurrence. The Act of Union in 1707 linked England 
and Scotland in a parliamentary union, this event ‘brought the ‘civic’ terms Britain and 
Britons into wider popular usage though still leaving intact ‘Englishness’ and 
‘Scottishness’ as core ethnic identities.’ (Kearney, 2000: 19)  
 
Regarding the historical origins and changing nature of a British identity. Colley (1996) 
asserted that a shared religion of Protestantism united an otherwise culturally divisive 
Britain as being remarkably different from those beyond their shores. There was also an 
element of geographical boundaries as Britain being an island kept Britons enclosed and 
together Equally important for Colley (1999: 1) was the role of the Monarchy which acted 
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as a ‘charismatic, unifying icon’ enshrining a sense of Britishness in the 1940’s and 
1950’s. The expansion of the British Empire was a significant factor in both British 
nationalism and citizenship. It meant Britain was not just composed of four nations but 
many territories worldwide whose nationals could be said to be subjects of the British 
Crown. Thus ‘Britain and the British came to be identified with the Crown, with 
Parliament, with the Protestant religion, and with the worldwide British’ (Kumar, 2000: 
589–90). This version of Britishness according to Colley (1999) and Weight (2002) 
declined due to the erosion of the British Empire, ‘Imperial Britain became post-imperial 
Britain with extraordinary speed.’ (Kearney, 2000: 23) The empire had served in making 
‘Scots, Welsh, English, and even many Irish men and women call themselves British as 
they could all as one united nation, share in the plunder and glory.’ (Colley, 1999: 1) 
Furthermore Weight (2002) suggests that a change in our sense of Britishness occurred 
in the post war period when a patriotic socialism based around government initiatives 
such as the Welfare State and being on the victorious side in the Second World War 
helped produce a feeling of commonality, that all British citizens were sharing the same 
experiences together.  
 
The decline of the empire in post war Britain allowed mass in-migration to Britain notably 
from the Caribbean but also from South Asia, Europe and Africa, by people who 
undoubtedly thought of themselves of British.’ (McCrone & Kiely, 2000, 26) This 
migration into Britain served in making many foreign nationals British citizens and 
successive immigration policies have meant mass migration resulting in Britain 
becoming a multi ethnic and multi cultural society. Therefore today’s articulations of what 
Britishness is have transformed from earlier incarnations, it is within this context that 
British politicians attempt to construct a national identity that they feel encapsulates 
modern British society. However it is not clear whether the young people of today can 
relate to their articulations nor do they necessarily agree with them 
 
Recent political articulations of Britishness  
 
Since the early nineties there have been attempts by successive prime ministers to 
articulate their respective visions of what it means to be British. It is necessary to assess 
the rhetoric of the government in order to compare and contrast what the participants of 
the study think about Britishness and if the rhetoric of government has any bearing on 
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their own notions of our national identity, additionally it is important as the state places a 
sense of national identity above other identities in order to address this perceived loss of 
a feeling of ‘Britishness’. 
 
John Major attempted to define Britishness, in relation to reassuring those worried at EU 
influence, Major’s assertion that Britishness is; ‘long shadows on county grounds, warm 
beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers and - as George Orwell said 
'old maids bicycling to holy communion through the morning mist.’ (Major, 1993) Is one 
of nostalgia, even almost romanticism. It also appears to exclusively relate to those 
residing in ‘middle’ or ‘little’ England rather than that of the whole of the UK.  
 
Tony Blair emphasised that Britain was built on moral qualities of ‘tolerance, 
openness…strong communities and families…rights and responsibilities and an outward 
looking approach’ (Blair, 2000) what is uniquely British about these values is unclear as 
any Western liberal democracy could claim these for their own. According to Blair Britain 
was shaped by a ‘rich mix of all different ethnic and religious origins over the centuries’. 
(Blair, 2000) Again whilst this may be true of the UK it can also be applied to many other 
nations, furthermore Blair here inadvertently reinforces the view that the UK comprises 
of civic and ethnic nationalism. 
 
Similar to Blair, Gordon Brown also indicated that shared values and ideals are intrinsic 
to ‘Britishness’, a ‘commitment to liberty, responsibility and fairness’ (Brown, 2006) 
strengthening a sense of community that in turn creates a sense of identity within the 
nation. He ‘argues for a new kind of patriotism based on shared values, rather than race 
or ethnicity.’ (Osler, 2009: 88) Brown has gone further than his predecessor in pursing a 
British identity, emphasising that Britishness is one of many plural identities a person 
may have ‘Welshman can be Welsh and British, just as a Cornishman…is Cornish, 
English and British - and may be Muslim, Pakistani or Afro-Caribbean, Cornish, English 
and British’ (Brown, 2006) this is in a similar vein to Crick (2008) who asserted that: 
‘British history, like Britishness as a concept or belief, is an overall, umbrella category,’ 
(2008: 72) Britishness as an umbrella category suggests that people can possess their 
regional national identities such as Scottish, Welsh or English as well as an overarching 
or all encompassing sense of a British identity. However as Byrant (2003) points out is 
easier for the Scots and the Welsh as many see Britishness as much more an overlay, 
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however this further complicates many English citizens relationship with Britishness as it 
is already often confused or intertwined with Englishness. 
 
For Brown an important point appeared to be, attempting to push a nationalism designed 
by civic patriotism rather than any type of ethnic patriotism. This civic form of patriotism 
is based on liberty, democracy and the civic institutions that are associated with Britain. 
Advocating ‘participation and civic engagement that is assumed to follow from 
Patriotism’ (Osler, 2009: 89), Brown had even called for events to be held to celebrate 
being British. The idea of a Britishness day where the nation can ‘focus on the things 
that bring us together... whatever our backgrounds.’ (Brown, 2006) draws comparison 
and inspiration from America's July 4 or Bastille Day in France. However, given the 
diverse make up of British society it is quite problematic to agree a suitable date let 
alone how and what exactly we should be celebrating. Another criticism of Brown is that 
he too took Britishness as synonymous for Englishness. Browns golden thread of liberty 
was sustained ‘by historic illustrations and literary references that are almost exclusively 
about England and Englishness, not Britain and Britishness.’  (Lee, 2006: 369) this 
includes his numerous misquotations and questionable references to Voltaire, 
Montesquieu, Burke and Orwell.  
 
In contrast to Brown’s version, David Cameron has stated that Britishness would be 
‘easier to promote if everyone felt like they were part of one country’ criticising the 
‘wrong-headed doctrine of state multiculturalism’ (Cameron, 2009). This suggests that 
Cameron believes that Britishness as an identity should hold prominence over other 
identities such as sub-state and regional ones. Cameron further criticises Brown for 
utilising values that are not exclusively British and suggests creating an emotional 
connection with the ‘monarchy, our armed forces and our parliament’ (Cameron, 2009). 
Cameron’s version is a much more exclusive version of Britishness, attaching 
importance to one common language. Both Brown’s and Cameron’s versions are 
deliberately vague and both express the importance of British civic institutions. Whilst 
Brown sought shared values as a commonality in a diverse and plural society Cameron 
emphasises the use of English language as a conduit for pride and as a standard 
requirement for integration and of belonging to one country.  Furthermore Cameron does 
not refer to the sub-state identities that the UK is comprised of, but rather Britishness 
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being about Britons. There is further evidence of Billig’s banal nationalism here with his 
use of deictic language. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Nationalism is an immense field of study incorporating an inter-discipline approach. 
Therefore due to the scale of study involved in nationalism this chapter has concentrated 
on highlighting some key theories surrounding nationalism, in particular those that are 
related to a modern multi-nation state. The chapter has shown that due to the 
complexities of a multi-national state, and the intricate relationship that exists between 
nationalism and citizenship, national identities are often conflated and complicated. This 
conflation has to a certain extent been aided by successive government policies of both 
immigration and devolution. The disjuncture between nationalism and citizenship and the 
problematic relationship between the two concepts has resulted in their competition with 
one another, the very fact that a person can possess a nationality and a stateness 
results not only in competition but these two different concepts becoming synonymous 
with each other. This in turn further complicates the efforts of politicians to articulate an 
inclusive version of Britishness rather than that of the sub state nation.  
 
Accordingly this chapter has looked at the shifting nature of ‘Britishness’ from early 
inceptions to the post war period, and has illustrated the current political discourse that 
has stemmed from the perceived crisis of Britishness. Therefore it is possible to show 
the difference between the conceptual debate and the reality of the politics of national 
identity, this will also provide the current context in which students are expected to learn 
and digest the concept of Britishness. Thus an important question that this chapter has 
highlighted is. Are students willing to subscribe to a version of Britishness promoted by 
the state? This is an important issue to address given the level of political discourse on 
the subject. Moreover their failure to articulate a coherent version of Britishness will not 
just be felt in the classroom but is reflected in the wider British society. 
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Chapter 2  
 
This chapter will focus on the complexities surrounding national history teaching, 
illustrating that the confusion of nationality and citizenship is mirrored in the history 
classroom. The chapter will also explore the current political discourse on the subject of 
history, highlighting the ideological rhetoric of national history teaching and addressing 
how this has been subjected to political interference. The main purpose then of this 
chapter is to provide an empirical framework in addition to the theoretical debates which 
in turn should provide a full context for which the study results are to be analysed and 
understood. 
 
Thus this chapter will investigate a key question of the overall thesis, does history 
teachings have any impact on students’ notions of Britishness? The chapter does not 
attempt to answer this question but provide a theoretical overview of the difficulties that 
surround national history in a multi-national state. Therefore the focus of this chapter will 
be to identify the theory behind national history as an important factor in nation building 
whilst showing that competing parties surrounding the direction of history teaching has 
intensified and complicated debate on the issue. The terminology of the ‘National 
Curriculum’ is also explored and deemed awkward as it implies one national programme 
of learning when in reality it is an area of policy that is regionally devolved. 
 
As well as history teaching this chapter will partly focus on the debate surrounding 
citizenship education, exploring a few key reasons for its introduction and the problems 
citizenship education has encountered, and its relationship with history teaching.    
 
The Complexities of National History  
 
Attempting to teach the nation ‘better history’ has equated to policy makers identifying 
history as an appropriate vehicle for which to promote an inclusive overarching British 
identity. Whilst there is broad agreement that history has to play a major role in helping a 
shared British identity prosper, there is still considerable debate around which model of 
history teaching is best suited to the UK which raises questions as to the suitability of 
history as a vehicle for introducing a national identity if no one single coherent version 
can be agreed upon. An important clarification to raise at this juncture is that this thesis 
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is not concerned with which type of history is best suited to increasing British historical 
knowledge of students’, nor is it advocating one form over another. Matthews (2009, 1) 
links a failure to answer five specific isolated facts to a much wider disparity of 
knowledge and understanding of history, resulting in a whole generation that knows 
almost nothing about the history of their (or anyone else’s) country. However this theory 
is presuming that an incorrect answer indicates a lack of knowledge of the wider subject, 
a simple point is that students from different schools will have been taught different 
syllabuses and topics. In this thesis we are not looking at what each individual school is 
teaching or has taught, it is primarily concerned with history regardless of its typology 
and this relationship with students’ concepts of national identity. 
 
The connection between history education and national identity is a strong and a much 
debated one and is certainly not confined to the UK. Clark (2009) notes the decline of 
national historical knowledge of students in Canada and Australia. The study highlighted 
that neither the teachers nor the students were responsive to a’ fixed and content-driven 
national narrative in schools’ (Clark, 2009: 759) one that politicians and the media were 
adamant be included in the curriculum. Furthermore as Canada and Australia are both 
federations education policies are designed at regional level, making the implementation 
of a ‘national history’ just as if not more problematic than in the UK. 
 
The notion of a national identity being promoted through history teaching has resulted in 
questions surrounding the purpose of history education. For many the ideal outcome of 
history teaching in Britain (besides imparting historical knowledge onto students) is as 
Andrews et al (2009) has suggested; preserving the national heritage, while 
simultaneously cultivating a new multicultural narrative of the nation. Levesque (2006: 
350) enquires whether history is a disciplinary inquiry into the past? Or is it an uncritical 
heritage exercise meant to enhance identity and advance political claims? Given the 
level of political interference in history teaching over the last three decades the latter 
option seems to possess resonance, particularly because ‘ideological discourses of 
nationalism are circulated by authoritative, major social institutions’ (McKiernan, 1993: 
34), such as schools. Whilst McKiernan goes on to point out that the UK has a society 
too plural for national discourses to take hold in schools, the aspiration from political 
actors is to form a sense of national identity through shared inclusive ideals that all can 
relate to such as a ‘commitment to liberty, responsibility and fairness’ (Brown, 2006)  
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Furthermore the effect of pursuing these national values in the classroom has pushed a 
national British identity into actively competing with alternative identities that young 
students possess. The ‘constructions of the nation are connected to competing 
conceptions of collective identity of a transnational character’ (Berger & Lorenz, 2009: 2) 
these transnational characters are identified as other prominent components of an 
identity such as religion, race, class, gender and ethnicity. Certainly in the UK ethnic 
narratives compete with ‘the master narrative of the nation’ (Berger & Lorenz, 2009: 2), 
which is increasingly promoted to be identified as a civic British one.   
 
Although the UK was named as one of Kohn’s five civic states in the West, Kuzio (2002) 
has asserted that it has actually always possessed elements of both ethnic and civic 
nationalism. Conflict in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) provides substantial 
evidence that ethnic violence has occurred and continues to do so in the UK, which 
highlights that regardless of geographic positioning we can identify both civic and ethnic 
dimensions in modern multi-national states such as the UK. These elements can be 
illustrated through the two competing history methods. It does appear logical that ‘new 
history’ can be associated with a more civic sense of nationalism. For a start new history 
can be seen as accommodating views and histories of those from other ethnic and 
national backgrounds and has the potential to be critical of a mono-narrative cultural 
British history, thus projecting a ‘warts an all’ history of English and British histories. It is 
hoped that this attempt to incorporate various civic sentiments beyond that of religion or 
race would promote a sense of common culture and ‘ownership in the institutions and 
functions of the British state and civil society.’ (Hunt, 2007: 10)  
 
Nonetheless while some may view new history as accommodating, it can be argued that 
it is simply assimilatory and compartmental, an example would be the inclusion of ‘black 
history month’ in the curriculum which rather than accommodating a ‘multicultural 
approach to history’ (Andrews et al, 2009: 367) highlights its distinction from mainstream 
British history by teaching stereotypical racialised ‘topics about slavery and post-war 
immigration’ (QCA, 2005: 6) Furthermore the argument that all nations have both civic 
and ethnic elements of nationalism highlights that despite ‘new history’ being associated 
with a more civic approach of history, ultimately it has its roots in ethnic nationalism no 
matter how it is presented.  
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Some myths (a crucial prerequisite for ethnic nationalism according to Kohn) are alive 
and well in history classrooms. It can be argued that through the more organic traditional 
history, heritage and patriotism are promoted and celebrated which in turn displays a 
more ethnic type of history. We can cite the trooping of the colour and Guy Fawkes as 
some of the examples of an English cultural history. Traditional history teaching that was 
prominent from the mid nineteenth century until the introduction of new history which 
began to ‘gain the upper hand in the 1970s’ (Matthews, 2009) was one that focused on 
the ‘achievements and the cultural heritage of Britain as a nation’ (Crawford, 1995: 440). 
Studying this type of homogenous history was seen by those on the right as essential for 
the survival of a nation under threat from amongst others ‘cultures with different attitudes 
and values’ (Deuchar, quoted in Crawford, 1995: 441).  
 
Despite the ideological divides that separate the differing types of history teaching 
Berger and Lorenz (2009:13) have emphasised that both state elites and professional 
historians have presupposed that education in national history is essential for ‘nation-
building’ and for responsible citizenship, aiding individual and collective identity 
formation. This process has been complicated through squabbles as to whether an 
inclusive national history rather than the traditional model of history is best suited to 
teach a multi national state in its classrooms. Terms such as the ‘National Curriculum’ 
(NC) appear innocuous enough however by its very essence it is problematic, the term 
suggests a homogenous national programme of learning in classrooms, however in 
reality each sub-state nation has implemented its own guidelines as to which and what 
history to teach. This reinforces the question as to the appropriateness of using history 
teaching in promoting the national identity, when in the case of the UK there are four 
individual historiographies in operation. Although devolution has intensified these 
‘national’ splits within the delivery of a national curriculum, education is one of those 
matters that have long been subject to sub-state leadership.  
 
Since the implementation of the NC in 1988 in England, all the nations that compose the 
UK have produced their own distinctive history syllabuses, reflecting the emergence of a 
broad-based ‘British’ historiography.’ (Phillips et al, 1999: 154) These devolved 
curriculums have to a certain extent implied the duality of Scottish, Welsh and Northern 
Irish national histories running concurrently with a Broader British state/civic history. 
Moreover in England the content and delivery of an English and British history have 
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often been conflated which has led to a ‘construction of what were largely English (and 
some Scottish) histories of these isles’ (Berger & Lorenz, 2009: 8). Although the NC has 
increased its focus on British rather than English histories by increasing statutory study 
units that focus on relations with other countries and the formation of the UK.  
 
Phillips et al (1999:156) has suggested that this wider view of British history amounts to 
only a fifth of all the units on the history syllabus with the remainder being at best open 
to interpretation and, at worst, potentially narrowly English in conception. However the 
QCA, (2007:115) has stated that British history been taught at key stage 3 should 
include histories of the different parts of the British Isles and their impact on each other, 
and that pupils could explore both the separate histories and identities of Wales, 
Scotland, Ireland and England and their interrelationships which should develop an 
understanding of the historical origins of the UK. Despite this an OFSTED report, (2007: 
24) has highlighted that the way many schools interpret the National Curriculum means 
a failure to tackle other important needs. For example, the curriculum is heavily based 
on aspects of English history. Those parts of the curriculum relating to Scotland, Wales 
and Ireland are very largely ignored. Importantly in many schools the stories of the 
people who have come to Britain over the centuries are ignored, even though these 
include the personal histories of some of the pupils. 
 
It is within this framework of striving to include and represent Britain’s growing ‘ethnic, 
religious and cultural diversity’ (Olser, 2009: 85) and prevent growing division that the 
government commissioned the ‘Diversity and Citizenship review’ which sought to 
increase an understanding of the UK as a multinational state. Incorporating not only the 
devolved nations but also ‘immigration; commonwealth and the legacy of Empire and 
European union’ (DfES, 2007: 96), vital to these issues that affect students in the 
present day the report asserted that it ‘is equally important that they understand them 
through the lens of history’ (DfES, 2007: 96).  
 
There has been a significant amount of rhetoric and publications surrounding the 
importance of history and citizenship education by policy makers (Brown, 2006, Balls 
2007, Cameron, 2009, DfES, 2007, QCA, 2005, 2007) and its continuous use as a 
platform for which to direct a sense of Britishness fitting with a wider concern about its 
decline as a salient national identity for those living in the UK. However despite the 
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attachment of such importance to history teaching in helping to readdress this loss of 
Britishness there has been to date too few engages with its target audience. The studies 
that have taken place suggest the recipients of the message may not be ready to absorb 
it. Fenton (2007: 328) has indicated that a considerable number of young adults were 
either not interested in questions about national identity or articulated some kind of 
hostility towards national labels. Additionally Greaver et al (2008:15-16) showed that a 
majority of respondents were sceptical of the idea that common history creates mutual 
bonds and were somewhat resistant to the ingenuous attempt to ram home the nation’s 
culture.  
 
Politicians in the classroom 
 
The issue of using education as a vehicle for promoting both British values in today’s 
society and an ‘awareness of the cultural diversity that now characterises British society’ 
(Andrews et al, 2009) has remained in political prominence for many a decade. However 
recently the attacks by British born terrorists on British soil in 2005, highlighted and 
preceded an increase of ‘public debate in Britain on citizenship, national identity, 
multiculturalism and the integration of minorities.’ (Osler, 2009: 85) Britain’s almost 
unique status as a multi-national state means that finding a common British identity that 
all can relate to is problematic, furthermore the significant numbers of ethnic minority 
Britons whose own diverse cultures means a sense of British identity is judged as 
imperative for national unity. The problem of promoting Britishness through history 
teaching only increases as divisions occur when politicians on both sides scramble to 
appropriate the past in order to construct a history curriculum that they believe will build 
a greater sense of a British identity.  
 
As with the concept of Britishness politicians have been eager to offer their thoughts on 
British history teaching with much debate surrounding the orientation of the content of 
history teaching. The debate of how history should be taught is however certainly not a 
new one, the dimensions of the argument have shifted slightly, but the core concept of 
this debate has been ongoing for many a decade. The idea of achieving a greater sense 
of British values and identity through British history and how ‘these concepts relate to 
citizenship and ethnic and religious diversity (Olser, 2009: 86) has rarely been absent 
from the political spotlight. We can place the differing and conflicting views on history 
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into two broad camps. Firstly there are those who advocate a traditional style of history 
teaching which places greater emphasis on the ‘transmission of the achievements and 
cultural heritage of the nation’ (Grever et al, 2008) this view is one that has recently been 
supported by the Conservative party as they view this method to be ‘a vehicle through 
which national cultural and moral values could be defended.’ (Crawford, 1995: 438) The 
counter to this is the call for history to reflect fully the ‘presence and achievements from 
ethnic minority backgrounds.’ (Greaver et al, 2008) that is a greater revisionist view of 
British history that gives a greater sensitivity to those from ‘social and ethnic 
backgrounds that have previously been omitted or portrayed negatively within orthodox 
school history.’ (Andrews et al, 2009: 367)  
 
A key concern for many political actors has been which of the differing forms of history 
teaching provides pupils with not only a general knowledge of a British past, but a 
knowledge that can help to construct a strong sense of national identity, by enabling 
them to reflect on what it means to be British. One aspect that is agreed upon is that 
history and citizenship education is to play a substantial role in promoting a national 
identity, particularly the former. It is however becoming increasingly apparent that with  
Britain struggling to find a common identity, there is ‘no longer a history with a capital H; 
there are many competing histories.’ (Phillips, 1998: 41) 
 
The introduction of ‘New History’ which began to ‘gain the upper hand in the 1970s’ 
(Matthews, 2009) challenged the more traditional method of teaching history, not only 
was there debate at an educational level but ‘Politicians and ideologues of both sides of 
the political spectrum…recognised  the ideological and cultural significance of the 
subject. (Phillips, 1998; 42) During the 1980’s some Conservative commentators were 
critical of some aspects of history teaching especially peace studies and multicultural 
education which they considered ‘would lead to the neglect of British culture as the 
cornerstone of national integrity and identity’ (Crawford, 1995: 437) due partly to the fact 
that ‘new history’ had promoted alternative multicultural histories, encouraging pupils to 
‘question and crucially evaluate established national narratives’. (Andrews et al, 2009: 
367) which for many conservatives is acutely problematic, as John Patten states ‘…we 
have to understand our history. I do mean British history…To have national pride should 
be seen as a virtue, not a vice’ (Patten, 1994) This view that many New right advocates 
share understandably attracted considerable media attention; the Daily Mail announced 
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that children would grow up knowing nothing about ‘the gunpowder plot, Trafalgar, 
Waterloo or Winston Churchill’ (Daily Mail, 5 May, 1994, p.8 quoted in Crawford, 1995). 
This is a recurrent theme with newspapers quick to assist political claims that Britain’s 
national history is disappearing and being replaced by general skills based learning. ‘A 
generation of teenagers know almost nothing about the history of Britain because 
schools are sidelining knowledge in favour of trendy topics and generic skills… 
producing a generation of history numbskulls’ (Daily Mail, 2 July, 2009).  
 
Graph 1 
 
 
Whilst the method and delivery of history teaching is debated it is the content that 
politicians focus on. Graph 1 highlights the spectrum and divide surrounding the 
politicalised debate on the content of history teaching. It is of course possible to have 
history content that is critical and of a mono-narrative and also a plural narrative that is 
celebratory. However the broad consensus has been that advocates of ‘new history’ 
would be placed between the plural-narrative and critical axis and those supporting a 
traditional approach to history teaching would tend to be firmly around the mono-
narrative and celebratory axis. This mono-narrative, celebratory narrative endorsed by 
many Conservatives reflects an inclusive approach to history teaching and also to 
national identity, which revolves around traditional British values being at the core of 
national integration regardless of the influence of other competing identity factors. This 
invokes Norman Tebbit’s now infamous ‘cricket test’ whereby ‘if you live in England, you 
should support your country of residence rather than your country of origin.’ (McCrone 
and Kiely, 2000: 20)    
 
      
      Critical 
 
   Plural-Narrative 
 
Mono-Narrative 
       
Celebratory 
 30
Despite Brown articulating Britain as a cosmopolitan society with a commitment to 
humanity and an important role to play on the world stage (which would be represented 
on Graph 1 near the plural-narrative and celebratory axis), when Brown addressed the 
role of history in schools he tended to side with the more traditional form of history 
teaching focusing on British rather than world or local history, asserting that ‘We should 
not recoil from our national history...I propose that British history should be given much 
more prominence in the curriculum – not just dates places and names, nor just a set of 
unconnected facts, but a narrative that encompasses our history.’  (Brown, 2006) This 
now changes Brown’s position on Graph 1 moving him to the mono-narrative and 
celebratory axis, where Conservatives Gove and Cameron are also situated   
 
Brown suggests that teaching a British history is central to discovering a common British 
identity, focusing on teaching Britain’s roots through the lens of an onwards march 
towards democracy, ‘the sole goal seems to be to understand British values through 
British history.’ (Osler, 2009: 88). Here again Brown conflates English events with British 
ones. Brown identifies ‘a golden thread of liberty stretching from Runnymede 1215, the 
Bill of rights 1689 to the four great Reform Acts, (Osler, 2009: 88) all of which can be 
considered English events not British.   
 
There is little indication that history teaching and education will remain what is currently 
a mix of traditional and new methods of teaching and content. Both Cameron and 
Michael Gove, the Education secretary, have strongly promoted a return to traditional 
history lessons, as a remedy to the perceived lack of national identity and pride. Gove, 
(2010) has stressed the need the teach history in order as history is a narrative. As 
‘children are growing up ignorant of one of the most inspiring stories I know – the history 
of our United Kingdom.’ Cameron (2009) has echoed the need to ‘bring back proper 
teaching of British history in our schools’, to replace the bite-sized, disjointed approach 
to learning about historical events apparently on offer in the current curriculum. 
Furthermore Gove (2009) ascribes building a modern, inclusive, patriotism by teaching 
proper narrative of British History - so that every Briton can take pride in this nation. 
Gove also believes that ‘Guilt about Britain’s past is misplaced.’ (Gove, 2010) which 
appears to endorse a ‘Our Islands Story’ narrative of British history, one problem here is 
that this has the potential to glorify all aspects of British history including the empire and 
slave trade which many believe should not be celebrated, there is also the potential that 
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this could isolate many students within the classroom. However Gove has recently 
backtracked conceding that ‘Our history has moments of pride and shame’ but still 
stresses that ‘one of the under-appreciated tragedies of our time has been the sundering 
of our society from its past.’ (Gove, 2010) the cause of which is a plural overtly critical 
narrative of British history.  
 
Citizenship Education – A lack of engagement 
 
As history has been the subject of political scrutiny and interference as regards to 
instilling a sense of national identity and national pride. Citizenship education has been 
the area under discussion where the focus has been on young person’s lack of civic 
participation and political engagement. Furthermore some commentators assert that 
citizenships introduction was a direct response to concern regarding a decline in levels 
of ‘social capital’ in Britain (Kisby, 2007). As citizenship can be taught as a separate 
subject or as a cross-curricular subject, it has most notably been utilised alongside 
history in somewhat of a two pronged attack to promote a sense of acceptance and 
understanding within a plural society (Kisby, 2007). The 2007 Diversity and Citizenship 
review’s main recommendation was to call for an extra dimension to citizenship 
education, namely a ‘fourth ‘strand’ ‘entitled Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the 
UK.’ (DfES, 2007: 14) this was in direct response to the challenges posed not just by 
increasing diversity within the UK but division and separation between different groups. 
Highlighted by the attacks by British born terrorists on British soil in 2005, it was hoped 
that citizenship education, would offer a shared identity based on membership of a 
political community (Blunkett, 2002)   
 
There has been considerable debate as to the worth and benefits of citizenship 
education, surrounding its role regarding ‘citizenship, national identity, multiculturalism 
and the integration of minorities.’ (Osler, 2009: 85) The introduction of citizenship as 
compulsory for all students aged 11-16 in 2002, was seen by a significant consensus, at 
least in many quarters, as a positive step. (Mclaughlin, 2000)  There has however been 
problems’ regarding the realisation and implementation of citizenship as a recognised 
curriculum subject, not least substantial and critical questions surrounding the definition, 
purposes and intended outcomes of such education. (Mclaughlin, 2000)  Another main 
issue surrounding citizenship is its lack of tradition, as it is a relative new subject within 
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the curriculum there is no prescribed teaching and learning approach laid down. While it 
could be argued that all subjects within the curriculum contain competing models of 
content and delivery, concerns over the complexity of, and confusion over the definition 
of citizenship is heightened due to the lack of tradition of teaching citizenship. (Kerr & 
Cleaver, 2004: 8) this is further complicated as the definition and approach to citizenship 
education differs considerably in each of the ‘home’ countries that comprise the UK. 
Citizenship education has developed in diverse ways in the devolved UK education 
systems of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, this reflects the differing 
views concerning its place in the respective curriculums. However there is a broad 
consensus that the chief aims of citizenship education should be to increase political 
engagement amongst young people and encourage an inclusive framework of civic 
identities (Andrews and Mycock, 2007) whilst simultaneously enhancing the roles and 
responsibilities that young people have as citizens of the UK. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By illustrating the complexities of national history teaching we have also shown the 
strong link between history education and the pursuit of advocating national identity. This 
has put the purpose of history teaching under further scrutiny as to whether the onus is 
on history teaching to preserve the national heritage and advance political claims.  We 
have demonstrated the theoretical debate surrounding history teaching, and have 
illustrated that some of the theories of nationalism and citizenship cited in the previous 
chapter can be applied to history teaching, as it can be argued that civic and ethnic 
forms of nationalism are represented by new and traditional methods of history teaching 
respectively.  
 
This chapter has also addressed the reality of the politicalisation of history teaching. 
Whilst this study is not concerned with what type of history is being taught in schools it is 
important nonetheless to understand that history teaching has been at the centre of an 
ideological battle for control that has been ongoing since the 1960’s, between advocates 
of traditional history and those of new history. Given the amount of political rhetoric and 
interference in both history and citizenship education surrounding the content and how 
the subject should be taught leads us to the question as to whether history teaching 
does succeed in increasing the feeling of Britishness for its students?  And does 
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citizenship education instill a notion of students’ identifying themselves as UK citizens? 
The next section of the study concerns itself with the findings from our questionnaire 
which will give some indication as to firstly, whether students are influenced by history 
and citizenship teaching in their notions of Britishness and secondly if there is any 
commonality between politicians versions of Britishness and that of the students. 
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Chapter 3 
 
This chapter along with the subsequent one provides an analysis of the data obtained 
from the field research. The study was entitled ‘What does it mean to be British?’ and 
comprised of 6 sections. Therefore the analysis of the survey in this section will also be 
sectioned into 6 sub headings denoting the sections in the survey spread out over the 
next two chapters. These 6 sections of the study contain both qualitative and quantitative 
data as questions included a multiple choice rating system but also direct qualitative 
questions asking the participants to describe in their own words their feelings on what 
Britishness was, what values it should consist of, and figures that made them feel 
proud/not proud to be British. In this chapter particular attention is paid to the data that 
relates to some of the issues outlined in chapter 1. For that reason issues surrounding a 
British identity, state and national identities and how relevant political articulations of 
Britishness are, are examined in this chapter. The findings from the study will be used 
primarily to answer the main research questions that have been set out and explored 
both theoretically and empirically in the previous chapters.   
 
Background Information 
 
The anonymous survey was undertaken in two 11-16 secondary schools within Kirklees 
local authority in Huddersfield during April and May 2010. 72 students participated in the 
questionnaire, all were aged between 14 and 16 years old which meant that they had all 
received citizenship education and most had at least a year of history education. In fact 
of the 72 participants 48 (66.7%) confirmed they were taking a formal qualification in 
history and 15 (20.8%) were not whilst 9 (12.5%) respondents declined to answer. 
However all will have experienced cross curricular elements introduced to promote 
British values particularly through compulsory citizenship education, additionally all the 
participants will have undergone 3 years of history education.  
 
To provide a demographic of the participants, of the 72 students forty four (61.1%) were 
female and 28 (38.9%) were male. As for religious beliefs, 21.2% stated they were 
Christian, 8.3% Muslim and 1.4% Hindu. 36.1% stated they had no religious beliefs and 
19.4% said they were atheist or agnostic. 9 students declined to answer. This indicated 
that religiosity would not feature often in the responses of the survey, which is inline with 
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previous observations that the salience of religion and in particular Christianity has 
dramatically reduced when considering the concept of national identity in the UK. 
(Weight, 2000. Colley, 1998).  
 
The first question of the study asked the participants to provide their places of birth, 
whilst we can not use the answers as a strong indication of a preferred identity (either 
local, national or state) nor can the study as a whole accurately indicate the overall 
importance of these identity tags available to the students, it is worth noting the 
distinction between the answers given. The data showed us that out of the 72 
participants all but 5 were born within the UK, with one born in Sri Lanka and one from 
Ireland. It was not possible to ascertain where the other three were born as their 
answers depicted a date rather than a place. 65.3% of respondents provided a local 
location only as their place of birth (Huddersfield, Shropshire, Leeds etc) compared with 
only 13.9% and 2.8% who gave their nation (England, Scotland) or State (UK) 
respectively. There was also 12.5% who answered with both a local and national 
(Huddersfield, England) preference. Whilst not indicative of preferred identity tags it does 
show that a British identity does not always hold preference when it comes to 
birthplaces. It also seems that many young people have an inclination to mention their 
local place of birth rather than a national or state location. This may indicate that local 
environments register as salient to the participants as their interaction and majority of 
experiences occur within this local environment.  
 
 
 
What is it to be British? 
 
This first part of the survey consisted of a range of statements regarding differing views 
on Britishness and asked respondents how important each statement was to them in 
understanding the concept. There were five categories (not important, not too important, 
important, very important and extremely important) for the respondents to select from.  
Figure 1 shows the responses of the participants to each particular statement. One 
participant declined to offer an answer. 
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Figure 1 : Important factors of Britishness 
 
 
As figure 1 illustrates a number of the statements associated to the concepts of national 
and state (citizenship) identities as to their importance in relation to a British national 
identity.  
 
What is evident from this data is that all the statements received a sizeable weighting of 
importance on what it means to be British according to the participants. This indicates 
that Issues surrounding nationality and citizenship, language, residence and integration 
were all seemingly important for the respondents. The ability to speak English was a 
statistic of note as 54.9% of respondents thought it extremely important and 23.9% 
thought it very important. This holds salience for the respondents more than any other 
statement available to them and indicates that an ability to speak a common language is 
of great importance in understanding Britishness. This does not necessarily reflect an 
exclusive sense of Britishness as being of key importance, a central theme emanating 
from this first question is that the respondents indicated that for them integration is also a 
key consideration for being British. Whilst being able to speak English scored the highest 
in the ‘extremely important’ category, this can be seen as a prerequisite for integration in 
to UK society. It is apparent that understanding the culture and feeling part of the UK is 
just as, if not more important as being born in the UK or possessing a British passport, 
with 32.5% stating it was important, 31.0% very important  and 12.7% extremely 
important.  
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Nonetheless 35.2% thought that been born in the UK was important with 22.5% and 
15.5% stating it was very and extremely important, whilst 21.1% and 5.6% thought was 
not too important and not important respectively. Similarly 26.8% thought holding a 
British passport was important to being British with a further 31.0% and 22.5% believing 
it was very and extremely important. This shows us that both nationality and ones 
citizenship are both regarded as central factors in being British. Thus becoming a UK 
citizen and integrating into British culture is equally as significant as being born in the UK 
and deemed more important than having spent most of your life in the UK. Conversely 
the similar high importance rates for nationality and citizenship may indicate that the 
students are not clear about the distinction between the two concepts, but that both 
national and state identities are of importance. Furthermore this highlights the theoretical 
content explored in chapter 1 illustrating that national identities and state identities are 
often mistaken as a single entity especially by those residing in England.  
 
There were also a number of statements in the ‘further comments’ section that provided 
additional articulations of the preferred identities for some of the participants. These 
comments give some evidence of a leaning towards an English rather than British 
identity. ‘we should not be taught how to be British as we are all different and should not 
have to be forced into being British, when some of us believe we are English!’ 
(Response, 17) this highlights both resentment towards being told how to be British and 
a preference for an English identity. Furthermore Responses 22 and 24 from participants 
also highlight a preference for an English identity than that of a British one. ‘Englishness 
is much more important than Britishness’ (22) ‘in my eyes I am English not British’ (24) 
These statements clearly show that some participants favour their sub-state identity over 
a British one, additionally it is possible to see that the respondents providing these 
statements were in the 20.3% who agreed strongly with the statement ‘Englishness is 
more important than Britishness’ (taken from figure 2). 
 
With the exception of having British ancestry all the other statements received a 
relatively high ‘important’ or more weighting. This indicates that legal recognition as a UK 
citizen is held as pertinent as the integration and socialisation process, whereby persons 
feel part of a community whilst respecting the laws and political institutions. This notion 
of commonality relates to Anderson’s imagined political community in so far as the 
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respondents indicated that living within the UK was important and also feeling a part of 
society. That is the notion that residents and citizens can feel and imagine they are part 
of a national community.   
 
Understanding Britishness 
 
Politicians’ articulations of what Britishness is and what it should mean seem to be 
perpetually vague constructions surrounding ‘British values’ and shared ideals that 
embody a national British identity as possessing something for everybody. In a plural 
society such as the UK this is understandable, however the examples that policy makers 
stress as being important and prevalent in a British identity and within British values may 
not resonate in the same way for young people of today. This section on understanding 
Britishness asked the respondents to provide 3 examples of what Britishness is. Once 
again the number of answers declined from a relatively high response count for the first 
answer to a relatively low count for the last. 100% of the 63 participants who chose to 
answer the question provided one answer, 85.7% (54) could provide 2 answers and only 
66.7% (42) managed to provide a third. 9 respondents declined to offer an answer in this 
section. Again this illustrates that whilst the participants are aware of the concept of 
Britishness and have an understanding of what it means to them, providing 3 specific 
examples of what it consists of is a difficult task for them. Although again the data shows 
there were more students who could think of 3 examples than those who could not.  
 
The data infers that the participants clearly associate Britishness with an ‘emotion’ or an 
‘attitude’. 28.3% of the respondents referenced a feeling or attitude in their answer, 
which meant emotions/attitudes were the highest scoring category of answers provided 
by the participants. Furthermore of all the answers included in the ‘emotion/attitude’ 
category 46.6% of these mentioned the specific term ‘pride’ which meant ‘pride’ in it’s 
own category would possess 13.2% of all answers given by the respondents.   
 
Another category that was of a similar vein to attitudes/emotions was that of perceived 
British traits which received 7.5% of all answers overall in this section. The category of 
perceived British traits consisted of statements that possessed references to an activity 
or scenario that although stereotypical are often associated with Britain. The examples 
represented an almost nostalgic view of Britishness with responses perhaps illustrating 
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personal experiences of the participants, and is reminiscent of John Majors ideas of 
what Britishness is illustrated in chapter 1. When the findings relating to British traits is 
taken together with the category of attitudes/emotions we can say that an important 
construction of national identity for the participants is expressionist, that is Britishness for 
the respondents is to a certain extent not material but emotive. Illustrations of this 
provided by the participants included ‘fish and chips at the Blackpool pier’ (response no. 
31), ‘watching football at the pub’ (response no. 14) and ‘Raining on the Cricket’ 
(response no. 3, 2nd answer). 
 
The second highest scoring category was that of ‘other’ which accounted for 18.7% of all 
answers from the participants. One reason for this category scoring so highly was that 
as the answers to this question were so varied it was not possible to successfully 
categorise or quantify them all. Therefore many answers were grouped into the ‘other’ 
category. This may also be indicative of the varied nature of the concept of Britishness, 
these answers show that a national identity means many different things to different 
people. The category of ‘British food’ also scored relatively highly. It received 8.8% of 
responses in this section, which indicates that when articulating their ideas of a British 
national identity British cuisine is of importance to the participants.  
 
The civic institutions of Britain were not a prominent feature in the answers provided by 
the participants. Civic institutions such as the NHS and British schools received just 
3.8% of all responses in this section. This is of particular interest as both Gordon Brown 
and David Cameron have attached such importance on the role of Britain’s civic 
institutions in their respective articulations of what Britishness is. Whilst the majority of 
answers received referenced the NHS or education there was also a negative aspect 
with a mention of ‘two faced politicians’ (response 36, 2nd question) Furthermore David 
Cameron has also referenced the monarchy as an example of a common identifier in 
defining Britishness yet only 4 participants mentioned the Queen or the monarchy in this 
section (2.5% of all answers) this highlights that these respondents do not affiliate a 
monarch with modern representations of Britishness.    
 
As well as civic institutions answers with historical references were also low. Only 1.6% 
of answers related to history for the first question, 5.0% of answers contained a historical 
reference. This perhaps shows that when participants are constructing a concept of 
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Britishness factors such as attitudes and feelings play a more important role than events 
from the past or the institutions of today.  
 
In fact there were more responses from participants that thought Britishness was 
unimportant or not relevant than mentioned Britain’s civic institutions and equaled 
answers with an historical reference. 5.0% of all answers provided alluded to Britishness 
as a concept being unimportant or not relevant.   
 
The category of Nationality and Citizenship was also one of note. Although answers 
relating to both were included in this category it was possible to see that there were 
answers from the participants that placed importance on being born in Britain and those 
that mentioned being British and British citizenship. 6.3% (10) of answers received 
related to Nationality and citizenship. Of these 10 answers 3 specifically mentioned 
‘being born in Britain’ (response no. 20, 27, 63) and one response referred to both 
nationalism and citizenship ‘Being born in Britain or being a British citizen’ (response 
no.5). This may indicate that both being a British born national and becoming a British 
citizen are relatively important factors for Britishness. However it is not clear whether 
many of the answers stating ‘being British’ refer to just citizenship or are inclusive of 
being born in Britain. There was also some evidence of a small amount of anti-French 
sentiment and/or xenophobia as 3.1% of all answers included a reference to disliking the 
French or other foreign nation. 
 
British Values 
 
This question in the survey related to Britishness and the construction of British values. 
We asked the participants to provide up to three examples of what British values were to 
them. This question followed the same declining participation pattern as previous 
questions. 98.1% of the 54 respondents who participated in this question offered a first 
answer. 79.6% (43) provided a second and 59.3% (32) offered a third. 18 (25%) 
participants declined to offer any answer in this section. This could highlight that some of 
respondents found the concept of ‘British values’ difficult to comprehend and difficult to 
answer. This may also illustrate that perhaps some participants chose not to answer 
certain questions in this section and other parts of the survey due to a lack of interest or 
a lack of knowledge surrounding the topic. 
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Answers that possessed a reference to an attitude or emotion were again the highest 
scoring. 30.5% of the answers contained a feeling or attitude. Again this illustrates that 
participants attach importance to Britishness consisting of emotions rather than tangible 
examples. Of the 30.5% of attitudes and emotions, the feeling of ‘pride’ accounted for 
25.6% and ‘respect’ accounted for 28.2% of all the answers in this category. This gave 
‘pride’ and ‘respect’ 7.8% and 8.6% of all answers in this section respectively. Unlike 
other sections in this survey the participants did elaborate on some of the examples of 
these emotions/attitudes. Many of the ‘respect’ answers were varied and related to 
‘respecting elders’, ‘respecting peoples’ rights’ and ‘respecting other people’. Whilst the 
majority of ‘pride’ answers were not specific, which again highlights that the participants 
are aware that pride plays a substantial role in their constructs of British values, however 
they could not be exact as to where to place this feeling of pride. Other notable 
emotions/feelings in this category were determination, patriotism, strength and tolerance.   
 
Very much similar to ‘attitudes/emotions’ but with a subtle but important difference was 
that 8.6% of all answers related to putting into practice attributes associated with 
attitudes. For example ‘possessing good manners’ received 4 separate mentions whilst 
other statements such as ‘looking after your neighbours’ illustrates that for some 
participants demonstrating positive attitudes is as important as possessing them in the 
first place.  Again British cuisine featured prominently with 13.3% of respondents citing 
this category in their answers, which may be a product of the intense media coverage 
‘British food’ has received recently.  
 
The category of ‘other’ was again used given the diverse and varied nature of the 
responses. 16.4% of all answers in this section were grouped into the ‘other’ category. 
The responses in this category were again extremely varied and included: money, 
accents, land, comedy, weather and ‘naming every player in the England football team 
at any given time’ (response no. 7). 3.9% of all answers indicated that the participants 
did not believe British values were important or relevant, whilst the same amount of 
answers (3.9%) contained language expressing a dislike for anyone not British. 
 
British civic institutions had not been a prominent factor in previous sections of the 
survey, and this pattern continued in this section. Although 6.3% of all answers were 
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comparatively high in this section alone, it still only amounted to 8 out of a possible 128 
answers. Once again this highlights that the respondents do not share the political 
discourse surrounding the importance of civic institutions and Britishness. The remaining 
categories of note were ‘family values’ which received 3.1% of all answers and 
references to the ‘British armed forces’ which received 3.9% of all answers. There were 
also 2 responses that indicated having the ability to speak English was important when 
considering British values.  
 
The next section and question in the survey consisted of a range of statements 
regarding differing views on Britishness and asked respondents to agree or disagree 
with each statement. There were five categories (agree strongly, agree, neither agree 
nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree) for the respondents to select from. 
Figure 2: How Britishness relates to me 
 
The range of statements in this section related to the participants notions of how 
Britishness relates to them. Figure 2 shows the responses of the participants to each 
particular statement. 3 participants declined to offer an answer. 
 
A first point to note is that of the participants’ attitudes British values. 11.8% agreed 
strongly and 48.5% agreed with the statement that ‘British values are key to 
understanding Britishness’. Only 7.4% disagreed and 8.8% disagreed strongly with this 
statement. Although over 60% of participants believe that British values are of 
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importance to Britishness, as discussed 25% of the respondents that took part in this 
survey could not provide an answer when asked to name examples of these ‘British 
values’. This is further highlighted perhaps by the 23.5% that neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the statement shown in figure 2. Nonetheless over 60% of the 
participants have indicated that British values are important to understanding 
Britishness.    
 
Another point is that 16.2% strongly agreed and 44.1% agreed that ‘The government 
should not tell me how to be British’. This to a certain extent shows that the participants 
do not agree with government articulations of what Britishness is. Furthermore it may be 
indicative of the respondents being resistant to attempts by the government to promote 
their idea of national identity. This is in line with findings by Clarke (2009) and illustrates 
that government constructed examples of what ‘Britishness’ is and what British values 
are, do not resonate with the participants. Comments from the ‘further comments’ 
section of the field research provide further evidence that may indicate some students 
are not receptive to state articulations of national identity, ‘I do not think that we should 
be taught any views on being British. I think it is fair to have our own opinions on how to 
be British’ (response 18) this may be indicative of resentment towards what they 
perceived as a government attempting to force Britishness on students 
 
Although 30.9% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, when 
taken together with the statement ‘Being at school has increased my understanding of 
Britishness’ of which the responses were somewhat even. With 10.1% strongly agreed 
and 29.0% agreed. However 26.1% neither agreed nor disagreed and 21.7% disagreed 
and 13.0% disagreed strongly. This may suggest a degree of passiveness towards the 
idea of national identity. This assertion is further strengthened when we consider the 
data from the statement ‘Britishness is not important to me’ 33.8% disagreed and 20.6% 
strongly disagreed. This shows that a majority (54.4%) of the participants do hold a 
British national identity as important to them. However 25.0% neither disagreeing nor 
agreeing, 13.2% strongly agreeing and 7.4% agreeing does also suggest that a similar 
amount of participants do not believe Britishness is important. This finding echo’s Fenton 
(2007) who has noted that there is a significant element of indifference or disregard for a 
national identity.  
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The participants also disagreed with the statement that ‘Understanding Britishness is not 
important to be a UK citizen’ 36.2% disagreed and 15.9% strongly disagreed. This 
indicates that the participants believe that as a UK citizen one should possess an 
understanding of what Britishness is. This reiterates the earlier findings from this chapter 
that illustrated that the respondents felt a common understanding of our national identity 
was key to a successful integration of British society.   
 
The final statement in this section asked whether the respondents agreed or disagreed 
with the statement ‘Englishness is more important than Britishness’, interestingly 20.3% 
agreed strongly and 23.2% agreed. This could be an indication of a preferred national 
identity for the participants, or an example of conflation between Englishness and 
Britishness, however 39.1% neither agreed nor disagreed. As this is the only question on 
the survey surrounding Englishness to presume either a confusion or preference of 
identities would be misguided. However some of the additional comments provided by 
the participants already explored in this chapter indicated a preference for an English 
identity instead of that of a British one. Nonetheless this assertion is a tenuous one and 
it is not possible to make any substantive claims in regards to the participant’s 
preference for a national or sub-state identity, nor whether the respondents confuse the 
two concepts without further study in this area. 
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Chapter 4 
 
This chapter explores and analyses the field research that relates to chapter 2. 
Accordingly questions that relate to history and citizenship education and their 
relationship with the participants notions of national identity and British citizenship are 
examined here. The data from the questions on British pride is also investigated and 
while this section could have been analysed in either this or the previous chapter, the 
association of national pride with some national historical narratives means it is perhaps 
more suited to being placed in a chapter focusing on the effects of education on 
participants constructs of Britishness.   
 
A Question of Pride 
 
Politicians have invariably associated the decline of national identity with a lack of pride. 
Often invoked alongside the concept of patriotism, policy makers want British citizens to 
feel a sense of satisfaction and pleasure in being British. British pride for many 
politicians also seems to be synonymous with British history (Gove, 2010. Cameron, 
2009. Brown 2006). However the ideas and examples that policy makers feel we should 
associate with pride and what the participants of this study think may be very different. 
This next question asked the respondents to provide 3 examples that made them feel 
proud to be British and 3 that invoked a feeling of ‘not proud.’ One point to note here was 
although 100% of the 71 participants who chose to answer the question could provide 
one example, 98.6% (70) could provide two but only 77.5% (55) could provide three. 
These statistics show us that whilst the participants were aware of examples that did and 
did not make them feel proud to be British, they struggled to articulate 3 separate 
illustrations, although evidently there were more students who could think of three than 
those who could not.  
 
This section provided us with some indication or evidence that history teaching does not 
exert too much influence on the students’ notions of associating British pride with history. 
Although 16.8% of all answers included some reference to historical examples, these 
responses included extremely vague examples being classed as historical such as 
‘winning world wars’ (Response no 6) and even vaguer and inaccurate ‘not losing any 
war’ (Response no 3, 3rd Answer). Furthermore only two students (2.33%) provided 
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more than one historical reference out of their 3 possible answers in this section. This 
could indicate that the students do not associate pride with British historical events, or 
have a lack of knowledge or interest regarding the subject. Whilst the student’s may not 
know about every aspect of British history, to say that they are not proud of Britain’s 
historic achievements is slightly unfair. Over half (59.4%) of all the responses that were 
associated with a British historical event referenced a perceived achievement, whether 
that was possessing an empire or being on the victorious side in World War Two. This 
shows that a sense of achievement and/or glory holds more importance than the fact it 
can be classed as historic. Additionally this indicates that the respondents adhered to a 
more celebratory historical narrative of British history. However, only 11.8% of 
respondents made reference to Britain’s reputation or characteristics. This included 
Britain’s status as a more economical developed country (MEDC) and its perceived high 
standing in global politics.    
 
Although historical references were relatively low in the examples provided by 
respondents, there was only one category that appeared more and that was the 
category we have termed contemporary culture. Answers such as fashion, references to 
cuisine, TV, and sport have been placed into this category. 39.3% of respondents 
referenced contemporary culture in their answers. 
 
This was clearly a very important factor when considering pride within Britishness. Not 
only does this indicate that a sense of national pride can be associated with events and 
examples that are relevant to the participants, it also shows that external influences have 
a profound effect on young peoples’ notions surrounding pride in their country, evidently 
more so than historical events learnt within the classroom. It is not so surprising that 
culture scored highly as the category inculcates many aspects of society that the 
participants will be familiar with or have knowledge about. The largest contributor to the 
cultural category was British cuisine which accounted for just over a third (31.2%) of all 
answers in this category and 12.2% of all answers in the ‘pride’ section of the survey, 
Taken together with the previous findings in the ‘understanding Britishness’ section this 
indicates that the cuisine of Britain is clearly something that the respondents attach a 
degree of importance to and a factor that acts as a serious conduit of national pride.  
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Civic institutions of Britain such as the National Health Service (NHS), welfare state and 
Parliament scored relatively low with only 14.8% of participants citing it in their 
responses. Again this is of particular interest as successive governments have recently 
promoted Britain’s civic institutions as an important channel for pride. This finding shows 
to a certain extent that the participants do not liken institutions with a with a sense of 
pride or a positive vision of Britishness despite politicians’ best efforts to connect 
institutions such as the NHS and Parliament to a common understanding of what should 
be celebrated our national identity. 
 
Given the amount of recent media attention on British service personnel serving abroad 
and of the repatriation ceremonies held in the UK we were surprised that armed forces 
were not selected more as an answer. Only 6.6% gave an answer with any reference to 
the armed forces. This may indicate that explicit symbolism such as the repatriation 
ceremonies does not really resonate with the participants.   
 
What this data on the subject on pride has shown is that there is a wide variety of 
examples that participants were proud and not proud of. Whilst history has clearly had 
some effect on both proud/not proud fronts Given the political wrangling in recent time 
surrounding the Union flag, it was surprising that the flag of the Union received only one 
mention out of all 196 answers, this perhaps indicates that a sense of banal nationalism 
does not effect associations of Britishness, certainly in the respect of British pride.  
 
In a similar vein, the next question asked the participants to name up to three examples 
that made the feel ‘not proud’ to be British. Again the number of responses declined from 
69 respondents providing one example, 65 (94.2%) providing two and only 46 (66.7%) 
managing to provide a third. 3 participants declined to answer this question. This again 
highlights that although the participants are aware of examples that may make them feel 
‘not proud’ to be British, when pressed they struggle to articulate more than one or two 
separate illustrations. Furthermore a high percentage of the examples provided by the 
respondents cross over the groupings we have constructed. For example ‘Drugs’ has 
been classed as within the criminal category but could have quite easily been accepted 
under social problems.  
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References to historical examples were extremely low in the ‘not proud’ section with only 
2.8% of respondents providing any mention of them. The 2.8% equated to only 5 
separate references to historical examples out of a possible 180, of these 3 were 
regarding Britain’s involvement in the slave trade and the other 2 mentioned the loss of 
the empire. This perhaps shows that advocates of traditional history need not worry too 
much about teaching a ‘warts an all’ narrative of British history as this data indicates 
historical examples covered on the syllabus are not (for these participants at least) 
synonymous with not been proud of Britain.    
 
The category of ‘social problems’ received the highest percentage from participants in 
the ‘not proud’ section, as 28.3% of all answers related to the issue of ‘social problems’ 
overall. The issues included in this category were examples such as chavs, binge 
drinking, benefit fraud, anti-social behaviour, teenage pregnancies and people not 
getting involved within their communities. Within this category it is evident that one 
perceived typecast of perpetuating social problems received a significant percentage 
weighting. That was the term ‘chavs’, a term relating to the appearance and behaviour of 
an individual. 58.8% of all answers relating to ‘social problems’ included the specific term 
of ‘chav’, this meant 16.7% of all answers in the ‘not proud’ segment related directly to 
chavs. This illustrates that the well documented negative aspect of British society does 
have a profound effect on influencing what makes young persons feel not proud of 
Britain, especially that of the ‘chav’ 
 
This is even more evident if we take the score form the ‘immigration’ category which was 
frequently mentioned as a negative with respondents citing grievances with not speaking 
a common language and the perception that jobs were being unfairly taken by 
‘immigrants’. This category received 11.7% (which is the same as ‘social problems’ 
without the ‘chav’ percentage taken into account). When these categories are combined 
it results in a total of 40.1% of participants providing a reference to perceived negative 
examples of British society. However 9.4% of respondents contrasted with this finding, 
stating that attitudes towards others are a reason for not being proud of Britain. These 
attitudes included references to prejudice, racism, discrimination, ignorance and 
stereotyping.  
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References to the Government or Politicians also received a high percentage in answers 
from participants in the ‘not proud’ section. 19.4% made a reference to the Government 
and politicians in their responses. This high scoring percentage that the category 
received may be indicative of recent media coverage surrounding British MP’s expenses 
claims. 
 
Another category that scored relatively high was the ‘other’ category. This was a 
collection of responses that participants felt not proud about but did not relate to any of 
the other broad categories, 14.4% of respondents provided an example that could be 
described as an ‘other’.  Examples included sporting failures, references to TV, specific 
geographic locations, music, terrorism and animal cruelty.  
    
The next section surrounding pride and Britishness asked the participants to name 3 
people who made them feel proud and then 3 people who made them feel not proud to 
be British. Again what was noticeable immediately was the pattern of the vast majority of 
participants being able to provide the first answer, a majority being able to provide a 
second and then only a minority being able to provide a third example. In this instance 
64 respondents managed to provide one example, 53 (82.8%) managed two and only 36 
(56.3%) students managed a third, 8 respondents did not participate in this section. 
Likewise in the corresponding ‘people who make you feel not proud’ section 62 
participants could provide one answer, 44 (71.0%) could provide two and a disappointing 
25 (40.3%) could manage three and 10 respondents decline to participate. This again 
highlights that whilst the participants are generally aware of figures that invoke pride and 
conversely ‘not pride’ providing numerous specific examples proved difficult.  
 
Out of all the examples provided by the respondents Winston Churchill was the most 
popular figure receiving 11.1% of all responses. The second highest was that of a family 
member which received 10.4% of all responses and the next highest figure was the 
Queen with 9.2%.  
 
Again given the amount of media attention the repatriation ceremonies at Wootton 
Bassett have received it was surprising that only 5.2% of participants made any 
reference to members of the armed forces although this 5.2% was the fourth highest 
answer, which highlights the numerous and diverse answers received. The most popular 
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examples that related to popular or contemporary culture were the figures of Simon 
Cowel and Cheryl Cole who received 3.9% and 2.6% respectively. Answers relating to 
popular culture equated to 73.2% of all responses and 2.6% were ‘other’ which included 
references to prominent figures that were not British. 
 
Out of all the responses 24.2% made reference to a historical figure and the answers 
provided were broad and varied, however Churchill accounted for 46.0% of the historical 
figures. Furthermore for historical figures to receive just under a quarter of all responses 
indicates that those associated with achievements and positive contributions to society, 
and those associated with being victorious still resonates in relation to pride for the 
participants of this study. Another former Prime Minister who received a sizeable 
weighting was the Liberal David Lloyd George with 13.5%. Emmeline Pankhusrt, 
Charles Darwin and Alan Turing each received 5.4% of responses associated with 
historical references. Other figures of note included Alexander Fleming, Isaac Newton, 
Oliver Cromwell and Robert Baden-Powell. These figures illustrate varied examples from 
the participants. Interestingly the vast majority of 91.9% of the historical examples are 
indicative of recency, as only 8.1% of the historical figures mentioned in the survey were 
born before the start of the 19th century. Additionally one of these examples (Mary 
Anning) was born in 1799 and is thus remembered for her actions within the 19th 
century.    
 
In the corresponding ‘not proud’ section recent political figures attracted the highest 
weightings. Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown was mentioned the most with 14.5% 
of all the answers provided. The British National Party leader Nick Griffin was the second 
highest as 9.9% of the responses referred to him. These findings could illustrate that the 
participants are reacting to recent events, and may be thought of as positive as the 
participants are engaging with current political affairs. 
 
Historical references were surprisingly low given the high percentage they received in 
the ‘proud’ section. Only 5.3% (7 separate references) of all responses gave a reference 
to historical figure. Of this 5.3%, 3 references were made to Henry the eighth. Mary I 
(Bloody Mary), Guy Fawkes, William Shakespeare (?) and John Forrest were also 
mentioned. This meant that tabloid favourite Katy Price received the same (5.3%) 
amount of references as all historical figures. Although this segment was intended for 
 51
references for individual figures, the Government received 6 references (4.6%) and 
criminals and immigrants received 3.8% and 3.1% respectively. What the data from ‘not 
proud’ illustrates is that apart from Gordon Brown and Nick Griffin, figures that invoke 
‘not proud’ sentiment are extremely varied, but tended to be examples from 
contemporary culture.      
 
History Teaching and Britishness 
 
The next section and question in the survey consisted of a range of statements 
regarding differing views on History teaching and asked respondents to agree or 
disagree with each statement. There were five categories (agree strongly, agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree) for the respondents to select from. 
The range of statements in this section related to the participants notions of how and 
what history should be presented in the classroom. Figure 3 shows the responses of the 
participants to each particular statement. One participant declined to offer an answer. 
Figure 3: History teaching, a common understanding or different views? 
 
The first point to note here is that 42.9% and 12.9% (65.8% overall) agreed and strongly 
agreed with the statement that ‘ethnic minorities should be encouraged to preserve and 
celebrate their history and culture, and this should be reflected in history lessons’ with 
only 8.6% and 7.1% disagreeing and strongly disagreeing. 
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This would infer some support for a more inclusive British national narrative, an 
approach which is more closely related with ‘new history’ (and would be situated near 
the plural-narrative axis on graph 1 in chapter 2). At the same time the participants 
indicated that they agreed that ‘there are too many interpretations of British history’ as 
39.1% and 14.5% agreed and strongly agreed respectively, although 37.7% neither 
agreed nor disagreed. This shows that whilst the respondents want ethnic minorities to 
explore their own history, they also believe that national history has become too plural, 
though the 37.7% figure could also indicate that some are not overly concerned with how 
many versions of British history there are.   
 
A second point is that 28.2% and 43.7% disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively 
with the statement that ‘some parts of British history should not be taught as they are 
offensive to some citizens on grounds of religion or ethnicity’ This suggests that the 
participants feel that British history should not be carefully chosen or diluted in any way 
irrespective of any offence caused to those from ethnic and cultural minorities. This is 
more in line with a traditional method of history teaching (and would be placed near the 
celebratory and mono-narrative axis on graph 1 in chapter 2). Taken together with the 
data from the statement regarding ethnic minorities preserving their history in the 
classroom, it appears that whilst ethnic minorities should be encouraged to explore their 
histories, it is not acceptable to discard or censor epochs in British history solely on the 
basis that it may cause offence to others.  
 
14.1% and 35.2% of respondents strongly agreed and agreed that ‘There is a lack of 
pride in British history which is reflected in history teaching in schools’. This concurs with 
criticisms from the Conservative party explored in chapter 2 aimed at ‘new history 
teaching’ and the lack of pride taken when teaching events in British history considered 
‘traditional’. However whilst the participants may believe that history lessons today are 
lacking in pride, they do not generally think that ‘History teachers must be loyal to the 
state and always promote a positive view of the UK’. Only 5.6% strongly agreed and 
12.7% agreed with this statement, whilst 33.8% disagreed and 19.7% disagreed 
strongly. (28.2% neither agreed nor disagreed)  
 
This shows that the students’ may prefer a ‘warts en all’ narrative of British history and it 
would seem that this data echos that of Clark (2009) in that student’s are not receptive to 
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a state edited, overtly positive narrative of national history, but one that is balanced 
depicting both positive elements and narratives associated with ethnic and cultural 
minorities. Nonetheless the statement that read  ‘The state should control what is taught 
in school history lessons to ensure we all have a common view of national identity and 
loyalty to the UK’ received inconclusive responses with 8.6% and 25.7% strongly 
disagreeing and disagreeing,  28.6% neither disagreeing nor agreeing leaving 21.4% 
and 15.7% agreeing and strongly agreeing.  
 
Although the participants had indicated that ethnic minorities’ multi cultural histories 
should be promoted and explored in history lessons, it was also possible to discern that 
the participants view the benefits of immigration in relation to British history with some 
scepticism. Only 2.9% strongly agreed and 15.7% agreed that ‘Immigration and 
globalisation have strengthened my understanding of British history’ and 28.6% 
disagreed and 20.0% disagreed strongly whilst 32.9% neither disagreed nor agreed.  
Likewise 34.3% strongly agreed and 32.9% agreed with the statement ‘Immigrants 
seeking citizenship must pass a test which proves they understand our national history 
and culture’. To a certain extent this points to the participants advocating that key to a 
national identity and integration in communities is the notion that knowledge surrounding 
British history and cultures is of importance. 
 
However at the same time 34.3% disagreed and 18.6% strongly disagreed with the 
statement that ‘It is impossible for people who do not share our history to be a British 
citizen’ therefore there is an element of contradiction and confusion within the 
respondents answers towards immigration. Taken together with immigrants passing a 
test, the data shows that although immigrants or others coming to live in the UK should 
display a sense of understanding and respect for a British history and culture which aids 
a notion of national identity, it is not imperative that ‘they’ share our history, but know of 
it. 
 
As stated at the outset of the previous chapter, given the answers provided we did not 
believe that religiosity would bear much significance. The data from this section also 
seems to add credence to that claim. 38.0% neither disagreed nor agreed with the 
statement that ‘Religion should be the most important dimension in the teaching of 
British history and should be respected at all times’ however 25.4% and 22.5% 
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disagreed and strongly disagreed, leaving only a combined 14.1% who agreed and 
strongly agreed.  
Figure 4: Studying history at school 
 
 
 
The first point to take from figure 4 is that 64.8% of all the respondents believed that 
undergoing history education at school was not relevant to how British they felt. This 
would give an indication that learning history at school had little bearing on their ideas of 
Britishness. However 23.9% thought that learning history in school did in fact increase 
their sense of Britishness and 5.6% thought it made them feel very British. These figures 
compared favourably with the 2.8% that thought History education did not make them 
feel British and 2.8% that thought it did not make them feel British at all. 
 
It is however, possible to further analyse the individual responses given to this question. 
Of the 64.8% of participants who answered that studying history was not relevant to how 
British they felt just under a quarter (23.9%) of the respondents were not taking a GCSE 
in history. Thus it is understandable that history education would not be relevant to their 
sense of Britishness. Furthermore of the 23.9% of participants who thought history 
increased their sense of national identity, 76.5% were undergoing a history GCSE. We 
can infer then that three quarters of participants who are taking a history GCSE do 
believe that it enhances their notions of Britishness.   
 
The Findings from the History/Britishness section appear to indicate that participants do 
not have a preference for either ‘new’ or traditional methods of history teaching, but one 
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that has elements of both. The respondents have shown that they believe there is a lack 
of pride in history teaching and that there are too many versions of British history 
available. They also agree that those pupils from ethnic backgrounds should be able to 
learn and preserve their histories within history lessons.  
 
Citizenship Education 
 
The next section focused on citizenship education in secondary schools and the effect it 
may have or not have on how young people think about life in the UK. The statements 
relate to the current debate as to whether citizenship education actually has much 
influence on young people and how they view life in the UK. Again there were five 
categories (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly 
disagree) for the respondents to select from. One student declined to offer any answers 
for this question. The responses form the participants were generally very positive for 
citizenship education, and the majority (53) of the students were aware that citizenship 
was being taught within their school, which as citizenship lessons have been compulsory 
since 2002 is not surprising, in fact we would have expected a higher amount of 
participants being conscious of citizenship education. This may illustrate that citizenship 
education in the schools participating in the study is amalgamated into other subjects.   
Figure 5: Is citizenship education changing the way young people think about living in the UK? 
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Figure 5 illustrates that 5.6% and 39.4% of the participants strongly agreed and agreed 
respectively that citizenship education has given then a clear understanding of the rights 
and responsibilities of being a UK citizen. Furthermore 7.1% and 31.4% strongly agreed 
and agreed with the statement that ‘citizenship has increased my understanding of my 
role in the community’. This indicates that the participants are applying the skills and 
knowledge learnt in the classroom and utilising these in their respective communities. It 
would also seem that citizenship education has achieved its aim of increasing students’ 
understanding and knowledge surrounding political systems within the UK. 12.7% and 
38.0% strongly agreed and agreed with the statement ‘citizenship education has 
improved my understanding of the British political system’, whilst only 14.1% and 11.3% 
disagreed and strongly disagreed and 23.9% neither agreed nor disagreed.  
 
However whilst there is evidence that illustrates citizenship education has had a 
beneficial impact on the students’ understanding of political systems, and their rights as 
citizens, the responses to the statement ‘teachers should not tell me how to be a good 
citizen’ were less than conclusive. 16.9% and 21.1% strongly agreed and agreed that 
teachers should not instruct students on their behaviour outside the classroom whilst 
14.1% and 11.3% disagreed and strongly disagreed, 38.0% neither disagreed nor 
agreed. This indicates that although the students are receptive to the content of 
citizenship education classes, how one participates within a community should be a 
matter of an individual’s discretion and not for a teacher to decide. Additionally it may 
indicate that the participants do not regard citizenship teacher’s views regarding 
citizenship as necessarily correct. 
 
The data presented also indicated strong support for immigrants seeking citizenship to 
have to undertake and pass a citizenship test which proves understanding of how to be 
a UK citizen. 26.8% and 38.0% strongly agreed and agreed with this statement with only 
8.5% and 7.0% disagreeing and strongly disagreeing. This may indicate that the 
participants believe that a common understanding of UK citizenship is imperative to 
successful community cohesion. The respondent’s answers seem to strongly favour the 
current government policy of immigrants undertaking a citizenship test.  
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Figure 6: Studying citizenship education at school 
 
Despite the generally favourable responses that citizenship education received form 
figure 5. Figure 6 shows that 52.9% of all the participants thought citizenship education 
as not relevant as to how they see themselves as UK citizens. However 15.7% agreed 
with the statement that citizenship education ‘Made you see yourself more like a UK 
citizen’ and 18.6% thought that citizenship lessons ‘Made you see yourself as a UK 
citizen’ this gives a combined 34.3% of participants that citizenship has had a positive 
influence on in relation to how they perceive themselves as UK citizens. This also 
compares favourably with the combined 12.9% of participants for whom citizenship did 
not have a positive influence on. These findings illustrate that just over a third of 
students believe that citizenship education has had a positive effect on their experience 
as a UK citizen. This infers to a certain extent that citizenship education does increase 
students’ awareness and knowledge surrounding their civic and political rights and 
responsibilities. 
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Conclusion 
 
This study has concerned itself with a number of questions relating to young students 
and their relationships with history, citizenship education and national identity. We set 
out to ascertain whether history teaching has any influence on students’ notions of 
national identity, at the same time given the level of political discourse surrounding 
national identity do these same students concur with recent political articulations of what 
Britishness is? Lastly due to the purpose of citizenship education ands its link to history 
teaching we wanted to know if the subject of citizenship education was achieving its 
aims of increasing political understanding and producing young persons who view 
themselves as citizens of the UK? In the first two chapters we have critically discussed 
both the theoretical and empirical contexts of nation building and national identity in 
regards to nationalism, history teaching and citizenship education. Then we have carried 
out and analysed a questionnaire in which young students have provided their views on 
these said topics. In this conclusion we will attempt to answer the main research 
questions posed at the beginning of this study. 
 
We can say with a certain degree of conviction that young students do not believe that 
undergoing history education is of much relevance to how British they feel. Whilst there 
is a minority that do feel history lessons have increased their sense of Britishness, there 
is perhaps a sense of ambivalence towards history teaching which suggests that it does 
not have too much bearing on how British the participants feel.  
 
Perhaps one reason for history teaching’s lack of influence on shaping national identity 
is that despite politicians and policy makers’ attachment to history as a instrument for 
promoting history, it is evident that young students are quite sceptical about state-
promoted history programmes which seek to inculcate mutual bonds through a national 
narrative. This finding seems to a certain extent concur with other recent studies in that 
students’ are not receptive to state edited, overtly positive narrative of national history 
(Clark, 2009), but one that is balanced depicting both positive elements and critical 
narratives associated with ethnic and cultural minorities.  
 
Whilst we were not looking to ascertain which if any of the much debated history 
teaching types provides a narrative that resonates the most with the students, we can 
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infer that students are receptive to elements of both new and traditional methods of 
history teaching. Students do believe an inclusive multi-narrative form of British history 
should be encouraged to help preserve and celebrate minorities’ histories within the 
classroom. Despite this it appears that whilst multi-ethnic narratives should be explored 
in the classroom, this should not be accommodated at the expense of a more traditional 
British historical narrative even if this was to cause offence to some on the grounds of 
religious beliefs or ethnicity. It seems that it is not acceptable to discard or censor 
epochs in British history solely on the basis that it may cause offence to others. This can 
be taken to imply that students believe elements of both traditional and new history 
approaches have a place in the classroom, which appears to echo claims made by many 
educationalists surrounding the orientation of history teaching.  
 
Additionally it is clear that students do feel that history teachers convey a lack of pride 
when teaching British history modules. This corresponds with criticisms from the 
Conservative party aimed at ‘new history teaching’ and the lack of pride taken when 
teaching events in British history that they feel should be celebrated (Gove, 2010, 
Cameron, 2009) This also may confirm that some history teachers feel uncomfortable 
attempting to convey a sense of pride and question its appropriateness when teaching 
history. (Hand and Pearce, 2008) 
 
Despite our findings that history does not overtly affect students’ perceptions of 
Britishness it is possible to discern that British historical achievements do to some extent 
invoke a sense of national pride, especially the British figures and successes associated 
to the Second World War. Whilst this displays a degree of recency it should be noted 
that it seems that a positive almost celebratory narrative of British history results in 
students associating British pride with historical events. This also illustrates to a certain 
extent that Britain’s role in the Second World War is still of great importance to young 
people despite the generation gaps that have formed over time. Conversely we can 
suggest that young people barely register a historical event/figure in relation to a feeling 
of not being proud to be British. What is interesting here is that given that there is some 
correlation between history and pride and hardly any connection whatsoever between 
history and not feeling proud, it is not unreasonable to claim that the participants seem to 
adhere to a more celebratory narrative of British history, which could imply that the 
students in this study are not taught a critical narrative of British history. Therefore we 
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can deduce that whilst history teaching does not influence students’ ideas of national 
identity history does to a certain degree have a bearing on students’ notions of national 
pride.   
 
Given the purposely vague and broad articulations by politicians of what Britishness is, it 
is not too surprising that on some issues there is a slight degree of consensus between 
students and politicians. Primarily this agreement centres on the significance of UK 
citizens sharing a common language. There were strong indications that an ability to 
speak English was of great significance in understanding what is important in being 
British. It is however difficult to ascertain if this is a cultural or civic finding. On one hand 
it could be indicative of the difficulty facing those who do not speak English to integrate 
and participate within communities and also with the civic institutions that the UK 
contains. On the other hand this may simply indicate an aversion for non English 
speaking UK residents or migrants based purely on their inability to converse in the 
‘home’ language.  
 
Either way the factor of a common language being important has had a recent political 
voice with some policy makers attributing importance to everybody in the UK being able 
to speak English in order to promote integration. (May, 2010, Cameron, 2009)  
 
However despite this one commonality between political rhetoric and students’ own 
ideas of Britishness, there is it would seem precious little else in the way of political and 
government discourse that the students subscribe to. This infers that young people do 
not like being told how to be British and are perhaps suspicious of government attempts 
to do so. This is inline with a growing body of thought that highlights young peoples’ 
indifference and disregard for national identity. (Fenton, 2007)  
 
Whilst the civic institutions of the UK such as the National Health Service (NHS), welfare 
state, and Parliament are heralded as beacons of both Britishness and British pride by 
successive Prime ministers, it would appear that these British institutions hold little if any 
importance at all for young students. Instead we can suggest that British pride for young 
students is clearly associated with examples and instances that can be described as 
‘contemporary culture’, (relating to British cuisine, fashion, sport and TV). Therefore 
despite politicians’ best efforts to connect institutions to a common understanding of 
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what should be celebrated about Britishness, our findings indicate that young people do 
not necessarily associate institutions with a sense of pride or a positive vision of national 
identity. On the contrary political institutions such as parliament are likened with a sense 
of being ‘not proud’ to be British. Whilst this may be a reaction due to recent media 
coverage surrounding British MP’s expenses claims, it also illustrates that although 
politicians may want parliament to be recognised as a civic institution deserving of pride, 
this feeling is noticeably not reciprocated by the participants in this study. This further 
highlights that students do not subscribe wholly to government articulations of 
Britishness, certainly not one that promotes British civic institutions as synonymous with 
a wider positive aspect of Britishness.  
 
An area where there seems to be both agreement and disparity between politicians and 
students is that of British values. Gordon Brown (2006) asserted that Britain was built on 
liberty, responsibility, and fairness to all, and we can say that for young students British 
values are also of importance in relation to what Britishness is for them. However the 
students made little or no mention of liberty, fairness or responsibility and instead 
suggested that ‘pride’ and ‘respect’ may be better alternatives. No doubt these values 
could be probably applied as important principles for any nation or state around the 
globe as it is not clear what is specifically British about them. Despite this, for the 
participants at least a society that possesses both ‘pride’ and ‘respect’ is one they 
evidently relate to being British. 
 
We can suggest that Britishness is clearly connected with an ‘emotion’ or an ‘attitude’ 
rather than (or more than) that of a tangible element, of these emotions we can say that 
the feeling of pride holds particular significance. However it is not only pride that seems 
to be an important emotion for young peoples’ articulations of national identity. 
Scenarios or activities that represent an almost nostalgic view of Britain (and often 
stereotypical) also play a part in shaping perceptions of national identity. Therefore we 
can say that an important construction is expressionist, that is, Britishness is to a certain 
extent not material but emotive.  
 
Not only do students disagree with political constructions of what Britishness is they also 
appear to reject the notion that being at school has much bearing on understanding 
national identity. This apparent indifference and disregard for national identity echoes 
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Fenton’s (2007) findings. It may also highlight that ‘other’ identities have prevalence over 
that of national ones. In spite of this, understanding Britishness as a concept can be 
seen as an important prerequisite to being a UK citizen. Therefore while national identity 
may not be of too much concern for young people they view an understanding of 
national identity for anyone applying to become a citizen as salient, this to a certain 
extent highlights an ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude to national identity.        
 
In helping and equipping students to increase their knowledge surrounding the British 
political system and gain an understanding of young peoples’ rights and responsibilities 
as UK citizens, citizenship education appears to be achieving some of its core aims. The 
positive attribution towards citizenship education alludes to a certain extent that 
citizenship education does increase students’ awareness and knowledge surrounding 
their civic and political rights and responsibilities. However it is evident that many 
students’ believe that citizenship education is not relevant as to how they see 
themselves as a UK citizen. This can be seen as indicating that whilst citizenship 
education is providing results regarding students’ understanding of British politics and 
citizenship roles, students do not necessarily apply this knowledge to how they view their 
own roles and rights within society. Yes students are now more aware of the rights and 
responsibilities of UK citizens but this is not much use if young people do not believe it 
alters their individual positions within a national community, and in this respect 
citizenship education still has to effectively reach a higher number of its students.  
 
A few doubts remain as to how citizenship education should be presented. Students 
appear to be unconvinced that teachers should instruct them on how to be a good 
citizen. This indicates that although the students are receptive to the content of 
citizenship education classes, how one participates within a community should be the 
matter of an individual’s discretion and not for a teacher to decide, that is to utilise the 
skills and knowledge learnt rather than behave in such a way within a community at a 
teacher’s behest. Furthermore whilst the majority of the students were aware that 
citizenship education was being taught within their school this leaves a large minority 
who did not. This builds on the points explored in chapter 2 that due to the lack of 
tradition, definition and purpose in teaching citizenship education it is often combined 
and taught within other subjects and as such we can say that some students fail to 
realise they are being taught it at all. 
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As citizenship education does appear to be increasing knowledge surrounding young 
people’s rights and responsibilities as UK citizens, it has also highlighted an indication of 
strong support for the citizenship test that would be citizens must pass to illustrate an 
understanding our national history, culture and understanding of how to be a UK citizen. 
This could indicate that the participants believe that a common understanding of UK 
citizenship is imperative to successful community cohesion, that immigrants or others 
coming to live in the UK should display a sense of understanding and respect for a 
British history and culture by passing a citizenship test. However, it is not imperative that 
‘they’ share our history, but know of it. 
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